# 1NC---Dartmouth---Round 4

## Off

### 1NC

Buddhism K:

#### Universal impermanence makes suffering inevitable, turning case and corroding value to life. Thus, radical acceptance of the status quo is a more virtuous choice than participating in the 1AC’s fantasy of control.

Meiklejohn ’19 [Brad; 2019; Alaska State Director for The Conservation Fund; Rewilding, “A Buddhist View of Conservation,” https://rewilding.org/a-buddhist-view-of-conservation/]

We suffer when we expect the world to be different from the way it is. “It shouldn’t be this way” is the perennial lament of conservationists. Here in the western world we are trained to be discerning, and we deploy our discernment to pick out all the things that are wrong in the world. And when we start looking, we start finding: climate chaos, species extinction, and the familiar list of worldly woes. It has long been this way, as the Roman historian Tirulean observed in 150 AD:

All parts of the earth are built over, trampled, full of commerce. Farms and fields drive back the forests. Even rocks are cultivated. Swamps are drained. Today’s towns outnumber yesterday’s houses. Everywhere on earth are residences, peoples, governments and human growth so clogs the world it can barely support us. And as our needs increase we struggle with each other for them and nature fails us.

When we hold an idealized view of the how the world should be, our happiness and satisfaction rest on an unattainable perfect future state. “If only we could stop the Pebble mine…if only we could save the Arctic Refuge…if only so-and-so were not president.” But “if only…” is a future that never arrives. Even when our wishes come true, we find something else to despair over, some other “if only” to pin our hopes on. Our default mode of finding faults has a corrosive effect on all aspects of our life.

Yet the world is the way it is. The world will always be imperfect. The world is not here to make us happy nor will it ever be the way we want it to be. How could it be otherwise? There are nearly 8 billion people who want the world to be a certain way, and only one world.

When we don’t accept things as they are, we suffer. This suffering comes in various forms for conservationists: frustration, outrage, anger, disappointment, despair, resentment, and stress are common among us. To be clear, we create this suffering. It is our choice to be frustrated, angry, or resentful, yet these states of mind do nothing to improve the situation and render us less effective. “The world is not coming at you, it is coming from you” as the Vietnamese Buddhist Thich Nhat Hanh says. What we think and feel is what we project. “With our thoughts we create the world,” said the Buddha.

The Buddhist way is not a path of resignation, however. It is a path of radical acceptance of things as they are. “It’s like this now” is a helpful refrain that short-circuits anger, frustration and despair. Acceptance can easily lead to indifference, though, unless it is harnessed to a higher purpose, such as the Bodhisatva aspiration “Beings are numberless. I vow to save them all.” The magnitude of this ambition, in full view of reality, takes the pressure off an impossible task. We do the work because it is the right thing to do, not to finish the job. Our path is endless. There is nothing to achieve and nowhere to go.

We cannot control the results of our efforts. The only thing we can truly control is our intention. When our intentions are wholesome, our work will produce wholesome results. If our actions are tinged with greed, hatred or delusion, we will reap the consequences. Dishonesty and deceit will undermine our own work. We can rest in the knowledge that those who pillage the environment will reap their karma, and we will inherit our own.

As conservationists we spend a lot of time communicating. I have often heard it said that we are conversationalists more than conservationists. But how are we communicating? Many conservationists come across as shrill, pedantic and righteous — not particularly attractive traits. What is the intention of our communication? Are we aiming to win, to convince, to belittle, to impress, to gain attention or are we merely stating what we know to be true? We must clearly set our intention before we communicate.

The Buddha placed particular importance on right speech, which for our purposes encompasses all forms of communication, including texts, tweets, phone calls, emails, grant applications, memos and letters. The Buddha defined right speech as speech that is true, timely, beneficial, endearing and agreeable. He placed special emphasis on truthfulness: “For the person who lies, there is no evil he might not do.” The German philosopher Nietzche said: “It’s not that you lied that bothers me. It’s that now I can never trust you.” Is all of our speech impeccably true, or do we exaggerate or shade the truth to bolster our side of the story? Is our speech harsh or divisive, or is our speech pleasing and intended to bring others together? Gossip, idle chatter, useless talk and speculation, all forms of wrong speech, were encompassed by the onomatopoetic term “sampapalapa” in the Pali language of the Buddha’s time.

Conservationists often divide the world into “us” and “them.” “They” are the problem and “we” have the solution. “If only they weren’t so greedy…so selfish…so ignorant…so lazy.” But there is no them, just us. We are all 99.99% the same. We all have the same impulses, emotions, and desires. We all want what is best for us and we all have our own answers to what is best for us. The Buddha identified the delusion of a separate self as a root problem, and today we are witnessing an epidemic of self that manifests in widespread anxiety, depression, drug addiction, and suicide. Our actions as conservationists should be selfless not selfish. By acting from compassion and generosity we transcend the polarization of “us” and “them.”

David Brower, a legend in conservation said, “All our victories are temporary and all of our defeats are permanent.” We know that conservation work requires (to borrow from another conservation legend, Brock Evans) relentless pressure, relentlessly applied, as we often fight the same battles over and over. The Buddha observed that impermanence is one of the three immutable characteristics of life. Change is constant; nothing lasts. “It is a bold thing for a human being who lives on the earth but a few score years at the most to presume upon the Eternal and covet perpetuity for any of his undertakings,” said wilderness warrior Howard Zahnhiser. We cannot ever achieve a permanent state of perfection or protection, and even the most devastating defeats give rise to future opportunities.

Conservation is a relay race, not a sprint, with the baton of obligation passed from one generation to the next. We cannot save all there is to save in our lifetimes. Trying to do too much too fast and too often brings on the dis-ease of “busy-ness.” Ask a fellow conservationist how they are and, more often than not, you get back the response: “Busy.” Busy has become the modern badge of self-worth, as if by proclaiming our busy-ness we fend off the nagging worry that we are not doing enough.

I would prescribe three things for modern conservationists: gratitude, immersion in nature, and meditation. Like a border collie that needs a job, we can give our discerning minds the task of finding what is right with the world, rather than all that is wrong. A daily gratitude practice of, say, making a list of five things you are grateful for, will bring benefits to your work and your life.

“Save it because you love it,” says western Dharma teacher Jack Kornfield. But you have to know it before you love it. I am always dismayed by how little time modern conservationists spend in wild nature. Every person working in conservation should take at least one 10-day trip into wild nature each year. And get paid to do it. Shorter trips just don’t cut it because it takes several days just to disconnect from the buzz of the modern world and reconnect with the slower, deeper rhythms of nature.

Deep time in the wildness will ground you in reality and will defuse the hecticity that renders most of us too distracted to be effective. Meditation provides the same grounding, and is a portable refuge that will make you more patient, more caring, more present, less angry, less stressed and less prone to burnout. If that is not enough, the Buddha also assured that mediation would improve your complexion, help you sleep better and draw rare, shy animals near! Don’t just take my word, or the Buddha’s. See for yourself.

#### Endorsing kuśala creates profound value as an act of personal meditation regardless of consequences---infinite value is impossible to consequentially evaluate and cultivating relationality is precious.

Hershock ’21 [Peter; 2021; director of the Asian Studies Development Program at the East-West Center; Buddhism and Intelligent Technology: Toward a More Humane Future, “Buddhism: A Philosophical Repertoire,” p. 38-41]

To embody wisdom and enact moral clarity requires attentive mastery. We will later discuss the roles played by focus- and flexibility-oriented meditation practices in realizing Buddhist ideals of personal presence. Here, anticipating critical engagement with the dynamics of the attention economy, it is enough to stress that attention training is integral to the processes of physical, emotional, and intellectual dehabituation that are needed to be freely responsive. The Pali and Sanskrit term for attention, manasikāra, simply means awareness that is concentrated or resolutely focused. This implies that one can be attentive with different degrees of concentration or focus. We can devote half our attention to cooking and half to conversing. But in addition to how much attention we are paying to our situation, Buddhism makes a distinction qualitatively between being attentive in ways that bind us to or that free us from conflict, trouble, and suffering.

It is possible, even without training, to be keenly attentive to our present circumstances. Young children avidly awaiting the ice-cream cone being prepared for them and adolescents in the throes of video game ecstasy are both clearly capable of highly concentrated attention. What is not so clear is whether they are freely attentive or compulsively so. Without training, our attention is readily and involuntarily attracted or distracted. In particular, we are especially susceptible to unwisely having our attention captured by the superficial, craving-inducing aspects of things (ayoniśomanasikāra). This, as we will see, is crucial to the workings of the new attention economy being realized through intelligent technology. Yet, with training, our attention can also be wisely concentrated—directed freely and intentionally in ways that are both sensitive to the interdependent origins of things and consistent with truing relational patterns (yoniśomanasikāra).

To the extent that Buddhist ethics consists in the goalless, nirvana-oriented practice of integrally cultivating wisdom, moral clarity, and attentive mastery, it is hard to place readily or without remainder into one of the standard categories of ethics grounded on definitive and generalized judgments regarding personal character (virtue ethics), duties (deontological ethics), or the consequences of actions (utilitarianism). Given Buddhism’s ethical insistence on pairing wisdom with compassion, a closer fit might be care ethics, with its emphasis on situationally apt attentive responsiveness. But Buddhist compassion is not reducible to the natural inclinations to care about and for others that are invoked by care ethics, much less to the abstractly mandated responses to suffering that are typically framed with reference to personal virtues or duties, or derived through a consequentialist calculus of harms and happiness. Rather, Buddhist compassion is exemplified in the ongoing intentional practice of dissolving the karmic causes and conditions of shared conflict, trouble, and suffering—a necessarily improvisational labor of shared predicament resolution in steadfast pursuit of increasingly liberating relational outcomes and opportunities.

What makes Buddhist ethics so difficult to place (and, potentially, so relevant today) is the fact that it offers only an open-ended training program—cultivating wisdom, moral clarity, and attentive mastery—and a set of “cardinal points” for discriminating qualitatively among relational outcomes and opportunities. Especially in early Buddhist contexts, the term used for the “true north” of liberating presence on the Buddhist “moral compass” was kuśala. Often translated as skillful or wholesome or good, kuśala actually functions as a superlative. Rather than connoting something that is good as opposed to mediocre or bad, it connotes virtuosity.

The ethical significance of aiming at kuśala outcomes and opportunities is neatly illustrated in an early Buddhist text, the Sakkapañha Sutta (DN 21). Like most early Buddhist suttas or recounted teachings of the Buddha, the Sakkapañha Sutta is structured as a dialogue. In this case, the Buddha is asked to explain how it can be that human beings generally want to live in harmony and without strife, and seem to have the resources for doing so, they almost always fail and end up embroiled in anger, hatred, and conflict. At first, the Buddha offers his standard psychological account of conflict and social strife as typically being rooted in jealousy and greed, which are in turn dependent on having fixed likes and dislikes, and these on being caught by craving forms of desires and tendencies to dwell on things. But this entire edifice of conditions, he finally explains, ultimately rests on conceptual proliferation (Pali: papañca; Skt: prapañca): compulsively dividing up what is present into ever more finely wrought units and relations among them, producing ever more tightly woven nets of fixed associations and judgments that at once support and entrap the craving- and conflict-defined self. To bring an end to conflict, interpersonal discord, and the suffering they entail, one must uproot prapañca.

When the Buddha is asked how we can stop engaging in conceptual proliferation and enact our intentions to live in peace and harmony, he significantly directs attention away from “inner” psychological conditions to “outer” personal and social consequences. To cut through prapañca, he says, we should continually evaluate our conduct (mental, verbal, and physical) in terms of whether it is bringing about kuśala or akuśala outcomes and opportunities, continuing on courses of actions only if they both decrease akuśala eventualities and increase those that are kuśala. Given that kuśala is a superlative, this means that resolving conflicts and freeing ourselves from trouble and suffering is not simply a matter of refraining from doing bad things and instead doing or being either harmlessly mediocre or what is considered good by current standards. These are all akuśala. Freeing ourselves from conflict, trouble, and suffering requires going beyond current conceptions of good and evil, realizing virtuosically shared presence with and for others. The course correction required is resolutely qualitative.

The aim of Buddhist ethics is to foster the cultivation of wisdom, moral clarity, and attentive mastery, establishing and then continuously enhancing commitments to and capacities for thinking, speaking, and acting as needed to realize superlative or virtuosic (kuśala) relational dynamics. The purpose of ethical deliberation is not to discover or devise absolute or universal standards of conduct. Just as virtuosic musical performances set new standards of musicianship, kuśala ethical conduct sets ever new standards of ethical excellence. A karmic ethics of compassionate virtuosity is an ethics of doing better at what we are already doing best, evaluating value systems and the ways that they are embodied personally and institutionally to realize ways of life that are progressively conducive to relating freely.

### 1NC

Lack of agent specification is a voting issue---key to all politics ground and mechanisms CPs, ruining NEG fairness.

### 1NC

T-Subsets:

#### ‘Substantial’ excludes subsets.

Tax Court ’65 [U.S. Tax Court; July 23; Dudderar v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 44 T.C 632]

[\*\*13] If the statement were "all" not modified by the word "substantially," it would refer to either 100 percent or such a small variation from 100 percent that such variation might be said to be de minimis. The word "substantially," however, is an elastic word not so easily susceptible of definition. That term as used in a provision of the Internal Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921 dealing with corporate affiliations has been stated to mean all except a "negligible minority" interest. Ice Service Co. v. Commissioner, 30 F. 2d 230 (C.A. 2, 1929), affirming 9 B.T.A. 385 (1927). In construing these same statutes the Supreme Court in Handy & Harman v. Burnet, 284 U.S. 136 (1931), concluded that 75 percent of the shares of a related corporation "did not constitute substantially all of its stock," citing in a footnote the following cases: Ice Service v. Commissioner, 30 F. (2d) 230, 231; Commissioner v. Adolph Hirsch & Co., 30 F. (2d) 645, 646; American Auto Trimming Co. v. Lucas, 37 F. (2d) 801, 803; [\*\*14] United States v. Cleveland, P.&E. R. Co., 42 F. (2d) 413, 419; Commissioner v. Gong Bell Mfg. Co., 48 F. (2d) 205, 206; Onondaga Co. v. Commissioner, 50 F. (2d) 397, 399. The cases cited in this footnote involve percentage ownership of stock in the related corporations by the individuals specified by statute in amounts ranging from approximately 68 to approximately 85 percent. Similarly in construing the provisions with respect to affiliation contained in the Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921 we specifically held that the combined holdings of two stockholders which were not in excess of 85.3 percent of the outstanding stock of the company which it was proposed be considered as an affiliate was insufficient to meet the statutory requirement of "substantially all," Gulf Coast Irrigation Co., 24 B.T.A. 958, 967 (1931), and cases there cited. HN5 We do not consider that the words "substantially all" as used in section 264(b)(1) should be defined to be a precise percentage to be used in every case without reference to the surrounding facts. Nevertheless section [\*\*15] 264(b)(1) does deal only with a quantitative amount in that it deals with money payments and therefore the words "substantially all" as used therein [\*638] must be given their ordinary meaning of all but a small negligible amount. 5Link to the text of the note Considering the purpose for which section 264(b)(1) was enacted, its legislative history as well as the factual situation present in the instant case, we conclude that the 73-percent payment in the instant case did not constitute "substantially all" the premiums on the insurance contract here involved. Since some uncontested adjustments were made in the notice of deficiency, Decision will be entered under Rule 50.

#### They don’t affect all workers.

#### LIMITS and GROUND---subsets are unbounded and spike core disadvantages.

### 1NC

Topicality Scope:

#### Strengthening a right overcomes opposing interests to effective enforcement.

Schauer ’82 [Frederick; 1982; J.D. from Harvard Law School, M.B.A. from Dartmouth College, James Goold Cutler Professor of Law at William & Mary Law School; Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, “The Strength of the Liberty,” p. 134-135]

It would seem therefore relatively uncontroversial to assert that freedom of speech is not and cannot be an absolute tight. This broad statement, however, must be tempered by two highly pertinent qualifications. First, it is important to recognize not only the distinction but also the relationship between the strength of a right and the scope of a right. This terminology is but another way of expressing the distinction between coverage and protection that I discussed earlier, but the terms ‘strength’ and ‘scope’ are particularly illuminating here. The scope of a right is its range, the activities it reaches. Rights may be narrow or broad in scope. Defining the scope of free speech as freedom of self-expression is very broad, defining it as freedom of communication substantially narrower, and defining it as freedom of political communication narrower still. The strength of a right is its ability to overcome opposing interests (or values, or other rights) within its scope. This distinction is nothing new, although it is often ignored in popular dialogue about freedom of speech. The point I wish to make here is that although the scope of a right and the strength of a right are not joined by a strict logical relationship, they most often occur in inverse proportion to each other. The broader the scope of the right, the more likely it is to be weaker, largely because widening the scope increases the likelihood of conflict with other interests, some of which may be equally or more important. Conversely, rights that are narrower in scope are more easily taken to be very strong within that narrow scope. It is much easier, for example, to say that there is a very strong, almost absolute, right to purely verbal political speech than it would be to say that a right to self-expression can be as strong. Any examination of rights must first recognize this interrelationship and then try to preserve some equilibrium between scope and strength. This is easiest but not necessarily best at the extremes. Meilkejohn, for example, defined freedom of speech as freedom of political speech by those without profit motives. Within this narrow scope it was easier for him to define the right as absolute (which he did) than it would have been had he broadened the scope to include other forms of communication. Yet the more narrowly we define a right, the more likely we are to exclude from coverage those acts that may fall within the justification for recognizing the right. Freedom of speech as freedom of political deliberation gains simple absolutism at the cost of excluding much that a deep theory of the Free Speech Principle would argue for including.

Vote neg:

1. LIMITS---exceptions are unbounded, infinite excluded workers and harms.

2. GROUND---core DAs and CPs assume existing scope.

### 1NC

European Union DA:

#### An erratic Trump unlocks European leadership over defense, diplomacy, and weeding out populism.

Polychroniou ’25 [C.J.; June 9; political scientist; Global Policy Journal, “Trump’s Animosity Is Bringing Europeans Closer Together and to the Rest of the World,” https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/09/06/2025/trumps-animosity-bringing-europeans-closer-together-and-rest-world]

The European Union came into existence in 1992 with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, which led to a single market, border-free travel, and the euro. Since then, the E.U. has evolved in various ways, although it has stopped short of developing a centralized fiscal authority and setting up a European army. Moreover, the E.U. has long been plagued by a number of legitimacy problems that have given rise to Euroscepticism among both left-wing and right-wing citizens.

Nonetheless, certain recent global developments are forcing the E.U. to upend many long-held ideas and norms about its own security and relations with other countries. Russia’s war in Ukraine and the sudden shift in U.S. policy toward Europe have made both policymakers and citizens across the continent more aware of the need not only for deeper integration and a new European governance architecture but also of the historical necessity to create a new world order. While Russia’s war in Ukraine has forced the E.U. to rethink its energy policy and compelled countries such as Finland and Sweden to become full members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it is U.S. President Donald Trump’s hostility toward Europe and its institutions that is bringing Europeans closer together and even making them realize that the E.U. is a safe haven when all is said and done.

Indeed, the latest Eurobarometer survey, which was released on May 27, 2025, reveals the highest level of trust in the E.U. in nearly two decades and the highest support ever for the common currency. The overwhelming majority of respondents also displayed support for a common defense system among E.U. member states and opposition to tariffs. Equally impressive is the fact that a huge majority agreed that the E.U. is “a place of stability in a troubled world.”

These findings come just days after Trump told a rally in West Mifflin, Pennsylvania that he will double tariffs on steel and aluminum imports to 50%. This move, which will take effect on June 4, prompted the European Commission to announce that Europe is prepared to roll out countermeasures in order to retaliate against President Trump’s plan to increase steel and aluminum tariffs. It said that it “strongly” regrets Trump’s threat and that “if no mutually acceptable solution is reached both existing and additional E.U. measures will automatically take effect on July 14—or earlier, if circumstances require.”

The concern among many Europeans is that U.S.-E.U. relations are not only seriously damaged but that the U.S. has now become Europe’s enemy. Since coming to office, Trump has launched an active campaign against European democracy, with members of his administration not only bashing Europe but openly supporting far-right parties across the continent.

The common perception about Europe is that it is indecisive, too slow to act, even when major crises come knocking at its door. There is an element of truth in that, as the E.U. has shown a proclivity for reactive rather than proactive political behavior. But the Trump shock appears to be rousing Europe from its geopolitical slumber. The E.U. is standing up to the bully in Washington and is looking after Europe’s own interests with greater zeal than ever before. This is because there is indeed an emerging consensus among European policymakers and experts alike that Trump wants to do to Europe what he is doing to the U.S.--i.e., destroy its civil society. MAGA hates Europe for cultural and political reasons. For Trump, as Célia Belin, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and head of the Paris office, aptly put it, “Europeans are an extension of his political opposition at home... and Europe is thus a symbol of the political ideals [that] Trump seeks to eliminate, transform, and subjugate.”

In its attempts to find a new role in world affairs in the Trump era, Europe is not merely reacting to Washington’s whims but seeks to implement policies that reinforce its own strategic autonomy, both internally and externally. The European Commission has updated its industrial strategy by speeding up clean energy and pursuing new trade agreements with reliable partners. While some European leaders see both Russia and China as representing a threat to the rules-based international order, there have been numerous calls by various policymakers across the continent for a closer collaboration between China and the E.U. in light of “Trump’s ‘mafia-like’ tactics.” European Union leaders will travel for a high-stakes summit to Beijing in July after failing to convince Chinese President Xi Jinping to visit Brussels for a summit marking the 50th anniversary of E.U.-China diplomatic relations. And France has called for a stronger E.U.-China alignment on climate action amid the U.S.’ withdrawal from the Paris agreement.

China is the E.U.’s second-largest trading partner. Europe is, in fact, not only growing more dependent on China for manufactured goods but, in spite of differences in bilateral relations, such as China’s position on the war in Ukraine, is actually warming up to the idea that the E.U.-China relationship is an essential vehicle for tackling global challenges and safeguarding international multilateralism.

Europe is also looking into other regions of the world as part of a concerted effort to promote ever more vigorously its own strategic autonomy. Since Trump took office, the E.U. concluded a free trade agreement with Mercosur, an economic bloc made up of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia, with scores of other countries (among them are Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru) as associate members. Mercosur, or the Southern Common Market, is the fifth-largest economy and encompasses more than 285 million people.

The E.U.-Mercosur agreement, which had been in the making for 25 years, still needs to be ratified, and Argentina’s far-right Milei government, which is in close political-ideological alignment with the Trump administration, could prove to be a stumbling block to its ratification. Argentinian President Javier Milei is, in fact, more interested in signing a free trade agreement with the United States, which would be in violation of Mercosur regulations.

After many years of negotiations, the E.U. is also close to finalizing a free trade agreement with India. The 11th round of negotiations between India and the E.U. concluded on May 16, and there is a firm commitment by both sides to strike a deal by the end of 2025. As European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said, this agreement would be “the largest deal of its kind anywhere in the world.”

If ratified, the E.U.-Mercosur free trade agreement will create a market of around 800 million people. When finalized, the E.U.-India free trade agreement will create a market of close to 2 billion consumers.

Trump is trying to remake the United States in his own image and also to destroy the E.U., which he says is “nastier than China.” One would like to believe that it is probably unlikely that he will succeed in remaking the U.S. in his own nasty image, but it is positively certain that he will not succeed in destroying Europe and its institutions, even though there is a lot that needs to be done to create a fairer and more inclusive Europe. In the meantime, however, Trump’s “mafia-like tactics” are bringing Europeans closer together and the continent ever closer to other regions of the world.

#### EU leadership contains eco-collapse, revisionist adventurism, and unregulated tech---extinction.

Attali ’25 [Jacques; Summer 2025; Special Adviser to the French President François Mitterrand and the founder and first President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Paris Dauphine; Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development, “Europe’s Choice in the Face of Global Reckoning,” no. 31]

Twenty years from now, people may say that the year 2025 was Europe’s last opportunity. It was the moment when the EU could have (had it chosen so) reclaimed its role as a central actor on the global stage—or, conversely, the year it resigned itself, through fatigue, fear, or ~~blindness~~ [ignorance], to irrelevance. The moment it lost control over its destiny and the totality of its freedom.

Europe has all the tools to become number one in the world again, or at least to maintain its rank as number two: with over 440 million people, the EU is one of the most extensive and most integrated economic areas in the world, enabling the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people. The euro is the world’s second most widely used currency, reinforcing the EU’s monetary influence. The EU is a global trade giant, negotiating free trade agreements and setting global standards—especially in regulation, data, and sustainability. EU regulations often become de facto global standards, particularly in the tech, environmental, and consumer protection sectors.

Through institutions such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice, the EU has established a distinctive model of transnational governance. The EU champions democracy, the rule of law, and human rights—both internally and in its external diplomacy, particularly through its enlargement and neighborhood policies. It exerts global influence not through military force, but through normative appeal, diplomatic networks, development aid, and cultural outreach. Through programs like Horizon Europe, the EU is a significant funder of scientific innovation and cross-border research. It leads in setting climate goals (e.g., the Green Deal) and digital regulation (e.g., the Digital Markets Act and AI Act). By setting high standards for ethics and safety—particularly in the areas of AI and data privacy (e.g., GDPR)—the EU influences global technological norms.

Europe is also home to immense linguistic, artistic, and philosophical traditions that influence global thinking and soft power. Erasmus+, the European Research Council, and open academic networks make the EU a hub for higher education and intellectual exchange. EU institutions have withstood crises (e.g., Brexit, the euro crisis, and COVID-19). A robust network of NGOs, unions, and active citizen participation supports democratic life and policy innovation. It remains a magnet for neighboring countries and regions (e.g., Ukraine, the Western Balkans), offering stability and development in exchange for reforms. Through PESCO, Frontex, and its missions abroad, the EU is gradually developing more credible standard defense tools.

However, the stakes are numerous, existential, and planetary: climate change, exacerbation of poverty, water shortages, and uncontrolled technologies—not to mention the specific European issues: democracy threatened, European institutions slowed down by bureaucracy, the lack of real integration, the absence of a comprehensive migration policy, and the lack of a credible common defense and security arm.

And yet, although these challenges are so existential, Europe has rarely remained so silent, its voice so hollow, its actions so lacking. At a time when the world cries out for clear leadership, for vision, for collective will, Europe hides behind rhetoric, reports without follow-up, and sterile debate. Let us examine just a few of the most telling examples.

Industrial Decline

The evidence of industrial decline is overwhelming. Prominent voices—those of former Italian Prime Ministers Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta, and others—have painted a damning portrait: the absence of European champions in key future sectors, a steady erosion of competitiveness, loss of technological sovereignty, waning innovation, fragmented markets, absurd competition rules that block continental consolidation, and a stubborn refusal to fund even dual-use military industries. There is no coherent industrial policy, collective innovation financing, and strategic vision to prevent economic subjugation. And these reports, though accurate, have led nowhere. Neither the Commission nor the Council have moved to transform their insights into concrete directives. No political will has emerged to turn diagnosis into action.

The forces of inertia—within Brussels, national governments, corporations, and bureaucracies—cling to their micro-sovereignties and narrow privileges. They prefer a patchwork of petty kingdoms to the rise of continental giants. They defend an outdated doctrine that prioritizes consumer protection while sacrificing strategic foresight and the interests of producers and workers. Thus, we maintain a hundred telecom operators while the U.S. has four; we uphold a fragmented banking system; we keep on forbidding transborder mergers; we let our savings finance America’s trade deficit, which in turn erodes what remains of our industry. Meanwhile, China—now the world’s leading power—relentlessly expands its reach, undermining our markets, jobs, and our autonomy.

And yet, all is not lost. In many sectors, Europe remains the leader. In nearly every domain, the Union counts at least two companies among the global top ten. The EU possesses vast savings, world-class researchers, a great entrepreneurial spirit, and agile and inventive family businesses. All it lacks is shared political will to invest massively in the sectors of what I call the economy of life, which should be the priorities: renewable and nuclear energy, recycling, water, biodiversity, regenerative agriculture, healthy food, education, healthcare, culture, democracy, security, defense, and research. The moment has come to break with the economy of death—built on fossil fuels, pesticides, industrial food, and legalized addictions—and shift to a wartime economy, aiming not to destroy, but to rebuild.

Geopolitical Theaters

In Ukraine, European countries are diplomatically represented: the French, Germans, Poles, and Brits are visible and active. For now, they appear to have delayed the inevitable American withdrawal. But everyone knows—in Paris, Berlin, Warsaw, London, Moscow, Beijing, and Kyiv—that such a day will come: perhaps tomorrow, in a week, or a year. And everyone knows Russia awaits that moment to deal a fatal blow to the heroic Ukrainian army. Yet nothing is being done—or far too little—to ramp up the production of urgently needed weapons, either for ourselves or Ukraine: no ammunition, no drones, no advanced warfare systems. And yet, the list of needs is clear: the Ukrainians themselves are handing it to us, at the cost of their lives.

Once again, we are not in a wartime economy. We act as if the Ukraine conflict will resolve itself, as if we won’t soon face shortages of raw materials monopolized by China, of components, of strategic supplies. Even the U.S. President is beginning to realize this—belatedly and painfully.

The U.S. President has openly and repeatedly expressed his desire—perfectly rational from a geopolitical standpoint—to take control of Greenland, rich in resources and strategically located along the future Northwest Passage. Meanwhile, Europe remains idle. Nothing is being done to secure this land, a Danish sovereign territory under international law, and by extension, part of the EU. There are no guarantees of this EU member state’s sovereignty. And yet, it is of vital importance to Europe for the same reason as it is to Washington.

Changing this equation would require Denmark receiving far more robust and explicit support from its European partners, including military backing. Why, then, has no proposal been made to station European troops there, to build fortifications, ports, and airbases on a collective basis? Unless such a request was made in secret and denied just as secretly, which would be absurd. Let us imagine: would U.S. troops dare to confront NATO allies on that soil? They would lose all credibility in Europe—and perhaps in Asia as well.

In Africa, as the United States turns its back, China advances economically, Russia expands militarily, and ideologies and religions spread their influence, no one can deny that Africa is Europe’s natural and strategic partner. Africa is the future of Europe. It could be its most fabulous opportunity—or its gravest threat.

Working with African institutions, countries, peoples, and diasporas is the only way forward. But if we abandon the continent, catastrophe looms. In the immediate future, Africa will be home to a third of the world’s youth. Soon after, a third of the world’s total population. And if we do nothing, hundreds of millions of climate migrants will be knocking at our doors. The next migratory wave must be anticipated, managed, and co-created. Yet neither Brussels nor major European capitals seem willing to rethink our relationship with Africa, to extend a hand, or build a shared future.

In the Middle East, the EU remains a mere spectator. It announces imaginary conferences, issues weak statements, and postures at the margins—but stays absent from real negotiations. Its paralysis prevents it from sanctioning, as it should, both corrupt or terrorist Palestinian factions and the Israeli government guilty of war crimes and betrayal of the Zionist ideal. Europe is incapable of aiding the devastated population of Gaza, of contributing to the elimination of Hamas, of helping to build a Palestinian Authority that is credible, honest, and capable of governing a peaceful sovereign state alongside Israel. And yet, Europe bears historic responsibility: its powers once drew the region’s borders. Its nations know the scars of war. It could use its tragic experience to propose peace. Why not imagine a Middle Eastern Common Market, stretching from Ethiopia to Iran, from the Arabian Peninsula to Turkey, including Israel and Palestine?

Environmental Issues

If Europe wishes to remain true to what it once was, it must now dare to become what it could be: a power of the universal. Not through weapons, but through ideas. Not through domination, but through exemplarity. Not through fear, but through hope. And first of all, by becoming the vanguard of a civilization reconciled with life itself. For there is no time left to waste: the planet is suffocating, the oceans are rising, and species are collapsing. We have entered the age of runaway dynamics, where the fragile balances of the world are unraveling faster than we can comprehend them. In the face of this, Europe can no longer be content with being a regional model of ecological virtue. It must become the architect of a global pact for life, built on five essential pillars. Europe can make every trade agreement a lever for environmental progress. No more free trade without climate clauses. No more investments without guarantees for nature. The Union can forge strategic green alliances with emerging powers—such as India, Brazil, Indonesia, and African nations—that combine financial support, technology transfer, and shared sustainability goals. It can lead to the creation of a World Environment Organization, with binding rules mirroring the WTO’s power over trade. And why not, tomorrow, a Climate G20, enforcing a global carbon price, a planetary tax on fossil-fueled transport, and minimum biodiversity standards?

Oceans are the beating heart of the planet. Yet they are being plundered, polluted, and exploited. Europe can initiate a global moratorium on deep-sea mining until science can assess its actual impact. It can establish a vast network of marine protected areas, particularly in the high seas, made possible by the new UN Treaty on Marine Biodiversity. Europe can help Southern nations monitor their exclusive economic zones by satellite and combat illegal fishing, often linked to organized crime.

We must now repair the living world. Europe can make a significant contribution to a Global Biodiversity Fund, which would finance reforestation, species reintroduction, agroecology, and the establishment of ecological corridors. It can mobilize banks, insurers, and investment giants to treat nature as a priceless asset—as essential as gold or oil. Above all, it must demand carbon-free, deforestation-free supply chains. Every product consumed in Europe—from tablets and steak to shirts—should display its biodiversity footprint. Buying can no longer be morally neutral. Europe can enforce this awareness.

Europe must go further: grant rights to nature, recognize ecocide as an international crime, and support the establishment of an International Criminal Court for Environmental Destruction—capable of prosecuting those responsible for oil spills, illegal deforestation, and the poisoning of rivers.

Just as it once led on human rights, Europe can now champion a Universal Declaration of the Rights of Nature—a legal and moral revolution, necessary and urgent.

None of this will succeed without a new alliance between science and youth. Europe could establish a Transcontinental Green University, connecting its top research centers with those in Africa, Latin America, and Asia to train a generation of planetary ecologists.

It could launch a Global Climate Erasmus, allowing millions of young people to gain hands-on ecological experience. And build a public, open-access platform for environmental data—a global observatory tracking both degradation and regeneration.

The AI Revolution

A new frontier has opened, silent and immense, made not of matter but of thought—a frontier where the machines we have created begin to think, decide, and act without us. Artificial intelligence is not coming. It is already here. And with it, the most radical upheaval humanity has ever known: a shift from the logic of tools to the logic of minds. A moment where decisions are taken before we think, where desires are anticipated before they are born, and where the boundaries between freedom and prediction, between democracy and algorithm, blur into opacity. In this grand transformation, the role of Europe is not to dominate, but to orient. Not to build the biggest servers, but to write the rules that will preserve our humanity. Not to chase others’ empires, but to become the guardian of meaning in a world flooded with data.

Europe has always had this singular vocation: to think about the world before transforming it. In the face of artificial intelligence, it is once again Europe’s task not to slow down progress, but to ensure that progress remains human. With the AI Act, the European Union is the first political entity in history to define the conditions under which artificial intelligence—even if it is not yet fully developed—can be considered acceptable. It classifies risks, sets boundaries, prohibits surveillance dystopias, and affirms that some technologies, however efficient, have no place in a democratic society. Thus, Europe sets a precedent: a civilization where machines are not above the law, and where the digital world adheres to the same moral imperatives as the physical one.

AI systems learn, decide, recommend, and exclude—sometimes without anyone understanding why. Europe refuses this opacity. It demands transparency, explicability, and accountability—principles that seem philosophical, but are deeply political. What is at stake is the very notion of justice. In tomorrow’s world, a decision to grant a loan, assign a school, detect a crime, or prescribe a treatment may be made by a machine. The EU reminds us that a decision is only legitimate if it can be explained, challenged, and appealed. It affirms that freedom begins where comprehension begins. Elsewhere, AI is seen as a lever of supremacy. In Europe, it is—or should be—viewed as a means to serve the common good.

The Union invests in collaborative research, funds cross-border scientific alliances, and supports projects that leverage AI to benefit climate, health, education, and urban life. Rather than selling attention, it seeks to optimize energy. Rather than manipulating emotions, it aspires to detect diseases. Rather than predicting consumption, it works to preserve life. It is the outline of another model: a knowledge-based economy where machines augment responsibility rather than replace it. Europe must serve as a counterweight to technological authoritarianism. It can lead the fight for global AI governance, the ban on lethal autonomous weapons, and the preservation of human dignity in the face of the algorithmic gaze. It can carry this message to the UN, the African Union, the G7, and to all who still believe that intelligence without conscience is nothing but ruin. Europe must make AI literacy a fundamental right: every child and every adult must know what an algorithm is, what it does, and how to live alongside it. Europe must also invent new professions, new ethics, and humanities—not to resist technology, but to better live with it. To ensure that the future belongs not to those who know how to code, but to those who understand why they code. And we could go on, about education, research, and health—so many domains where Europe could lead.

There are so many instances of silence and procrastination. How should one explain this passivity, abdication, and tragic drift? If not, it is due to the leaders’ failure to grasp the urgency of the moment. An inert Europe only strengthens populism, fuels extremism, and paves the way for its downfall.

It is not too late. We can still choose. We can still reclaim our sovereignty. We can still become a major actor in history. An extraordinary opportunity lies before Europe. But it must find the courage to seize it.

### 1NC

Midterms DA


#### The United States federal government should:

#### ---ban development of the Golden Dome;

#### ---fund development of the Golden Dome.

#### Dems win now.

Polymarket ’1-16 [Polymarket; 2025; American cryptocurrency-based prediction market, headquartered in Manhattan, New York City; "Which party will win the House in 2026? Predictions & Odd...," https://polymarket.com/event/which-party-will-win-the-house-in-2026]



#### The plan enables the GOP to credibly campaign on worker-focused economic populism. That beats Dems to the punch and flips key districts.

Abbott ’25 [Jared, Dustin Guastella, Carson Kindred, and Sean Mason; July 2025; PhD, political scientist, professor, and director of the Center for Working-Class Politics; The Center for Working-Class Politics, “Working-Class Social and Economic Attitudes: An Analysis,” https://images.jacobinmag.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/20091032/CWCP-Jacobin-report-20250721.pdf]

The results in the previous section suggest that Democrats have an opportunity to reach more working-class voters through progressive economic appeals. At the same time, while working-class Americans are more conservative than middle- and upper-class Americans on cultural and social issues, they are no more so than in the past when Democrats garnered large majorities of working-class voters. And working-class voters have only become more progressive on many of these issues, not less. On economics, predistributive policies (like raising the minimum wage, policies to protect and expand access to good jobs, and increasing worker influence in corporate decision-making) along with some redistributive policies (such as protecting Social Security and Medicare, increasing spending on health care and education, and tax hikes on the rich) are all viewed favorably by working-class Americans. But as we have argued several times over, Kamala Harris’s 2024 presidential campaign did not sufficiently embrace such appeals, and even moved away from them as the campaign unfolded.17

The advantages of a worker-focused economic populism are clear. Ahead of the 2026 midterms and 2028 presidential election, the Democratic Party would be wise to promote candidates that can credibly campaign on such a program. But even if a candidate has the right messaging and credibility on economic issues, can they really sway enough voters to abandon the MAGA camp? To investigate this question, we first analyzed respondents from the ANES who voted for Trump in 2020 and fit our definition of the working class (bottom two-thirds of income with no college degree) to see what percentage of them hold economically progressive attitudes.18

We found that a substantial proportion of working-class respondents who voted for Trump in 2020 held favorable views of progressive economic policies like a higher minimum wage (38%), increased Social Security spending (59%), increased public school spending (50%), a tax on millionaires (39%), and more. And these were not simply policy-specific anomalies. Indeed, many Trump voters held progressive views across a range of economic issues. For instance, table 2 shows that over 20% of working-class Trump voters were in favor of an economic policy package that included increasing federal funding for public schools, increasing federal funding for Social Security, and increasing the minimum wage. A similar percentage of working-class Trump voters favored a four-item economic policy package that includes those three items plus increasing income tax on those earning a million dollars a year. While these economically progressive Trump voters hardly amount to a MAGA majority, they represent a meaningful slice of the electorate (around 5%) that could easily tip elections in key working-class-heavy swing states.

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These are encouraging statistics, but given the strong pull of partisanship and high salience of divisive social and cultural issues in US politics, there are obviously many Trump voters who would likely never vote for a Democratic candidate over a Republican, even if the Democrat’s platform were more economically appealing. For an individual voter, the appeal of a Democrat with an egalitarian economic platform often depends on that voter’s attitudes toward social and cultural issues, at least to some degree. Our remaining analysis takes this into account by assuming that all respondents that have low social progressivism scores are unwinnable under any circumstances, and therefore excludes them from our analysis. Doing so results in a subpopulation of Republican voters who should be more receptive to Democrats’ progressive economic messaging.

To quantify social progressivism, we scored each respondent on a scale of most to least socially progressive based on their responses to a range of survey questions about social policies. Similarly, we scored each respondent on a scale from least to most economically egalitarian based on their responses to economic policy questions.

Social progressivism scores were distilled from responses to fifty-four social policy questions. Economic egalitarianism scores were distilled from responses to twenty economic policy questions. For each respondent, a single social progressivism score between 0 and 1 was estimated from their responses to the social policy questions. Similarly, we generated a single economic egalitarianism score between 0 and 1 from respondents’ positions on the twenty economic policy questions. For both metrics, a score of 1 is most progressive or egalitarian and a score of 0 is least so. Summarizing each respondent this way allows us to visualize populations along social and economic policy axes, which we do for all working-class respondents across partisanship in figure 17. Consistent with previous analyses that have found a strong and increasing correlation between American voters’ social-cultural and economic preferences, we find a very strong relationship between economic and social scores in Figure 17.19

<<FIGURE OMITTED>>

We repeat the same visualization in figure 18, this time only showing 2020 Trump voters. Predictably, this population is concentrated more in the lower left quadrant, indicating that it is, on average, quite conservative on both axes. Indeed, just 11% of respondents are in the top-right quadrant of figure 18, indicating high social progressivism and economic egalitarianism. Still, 11% can be electorally meaningful. For one thing, 11% of 2020 working-class Trump voters comprises about 6% of all 2020 Trump voters and about 2.7% of all people who voted for either Trump or Joe Biden in 2020. Recall that Kamala Harris lost the nationwide popular vote by 1.5% in the 2024 presidential election.

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To get a clearer sense of what percentage of Trump 2020 voters held socially moderate or progressive views, we set a social progressivism score of 0.33 and analyzed the subpopulation above it to see how appealing certain economic policies were to them.20 The populations above and below this threshold are shown in figure 19. The subpopulation above the threshold (socially moderate and socially progressive working-class Trump voters) comprises 40% of all working-class Trump voters.

We use this 0.33 social progressivism score to exclude the most socially conservative respondents from additional analysis. The goal is to ensure that our estimates of how many voters may be swayed by appealing economic policies are as realistic and credible as possible. To help understand what a social progressivism threshold of 0.33 means, we analyzed the twenty respondents closest to this threshold but above it. These are the most socially conservative members of the population that we will analyze going forward.

An analysis where the most conservative respondents that we classify as “social moderates” stand on a range of social issues arguably paints a more socially moderate picture than a socially conservative one. Only a few of the twenty favored an outright ban on abortion (3), and only a small handful favored abortion only in cases of rape, incest, or when the woman’s life is in danger (6). Nearly all favored requiring background checks for gun purchases (16), though fewer than half favored a ban on assault rifles (8). On immigration, most opposed separating children from their detained immigrant parents (12), but most also reported that they had at least some fear that immigrants would take their jobs (15). On LGBTQ issues, most were in favor of laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination (16), but several were opposed to laws requiring businesses to provide services to same-sex couples (8). A majority believed that there was at least a moderate amount of discrimination against blacks in the United States (15), while zero believed there is none. A majority also believed climate change impacts severe weather in the United States (13), while zero believed climate change had no impact. Overall, considering these are the most socially conservative members of the population that will be analyzed going forward, it seems likely that these voters’ preferences on social issues could be moderate enough for many of them to not rule out voting for a Democratic candidate under the right circumstances.

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What are the right circumstances, though? Even after excluding social conservatives below our 0.33 threshold, we were still able to identify a significant population that responded favorably to progressive economic policy questions. For example, the proportion of the entire electorate that was working-class, socially moderate (or socially progressive), voted for Trump, and supported increasing the minimum wage and increased spending on Social Security and public schools was 2.5%. Though small, this population is unquestionably large enough to make the difference in working-class-heavy swing states.

For example, projecting the relative size of this group to the size of the US electorate results in a population more than twice the size of Trump’s 1.5% popular vote margin over Harris in the 2024 presidential election. It more than covers Trump’s popular vote advantages in Georgia (2.2%), Michigan (1.4%), Pennsylvania (1.7%), and Wisconsin (0.9%) as well.

Table 3 repeats the analysis of table 2, but only for this subpopulation of socially moderate and socially progressive working-class Trump voters. This analysis makes an even stronger case for the potential for an economically progressive platform to win over significant portions of working-class Trump voters. A Democratic politician running on some combination of progressive policies around public school spending, Social Security, minimum wage, a millionaire tax, and government health insurance should maximize their appeal to socially moderate and socially progressive working-class Trump voters. And these are substantial proportions too. For example, the revelation that 8.4% of working-class Trump voters are essentially “Bernie Bros” — in that they support a millionaire tax, higher minimum wage, and single-payer health care — indicates significant potential for the right kind of Democratic candidates with the right kind of messaging to help the party rebound from its 2024 failure.

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To explore which underlying demographic factors might be associated with support for the economic policies shown in table 3, we compare three groups of respondents: (1) all working-class ANES respondents, (2) those who voted for Trump in 2020, and (3) Trump-voting respondents who also ranked in the top third on the social progressivism scale. These results are presented in table 4.

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We find that the largest demographic differences between the non–socially conservative working-class Trump voter population and the overall working-class Trump voter population are for gun ownership (8.6%) and nationalist sentiment (“Prioritizes US,” 13.8%). By contrast, demographic variables related to age, race, income, and religion show modest differences. Figure 20 shows the results of a regression analysis examining which demographic factors are associated with social conservatism among 2020 working-class Trump voters. Specifically, we regress a set of demographic variables on an indicator for whether a respondent falls below our top-third threshold on the social progressivism scale.

A few factors stand out as statistically significant predictors of lower social progressivism: working-class Trump voters who are more politically engaged, own guns, or prioritize political pragmatism are more likely to be socially conservative. In contrast, variables such as age, income, gender, and race were not statistically significant. This suggests that identity-based outreach alone is unlikely to be effective in mobilizing the socially moderate and progressive subset of working-class Trump voters, as these traits do not meaningfully predict their political attitudes.

<<FIGURE OMITTED>>

This result suggests that the most promising Republican targets of progressive economic appeals should be individuals who are not deeply imbued in right-wing media and those who are not likely to attend gun clubs.21 The political pragmatism likely suggests that the most socially conservative Republicans are committed to achieving their core political objectives regardless of the sacrifices they may have to make, such as supporting candidates, like Trump, who do not share common conservative cultural values.

The number of factors that show no meaningful relationship with social conservatism is striking. In addition to identity-based characteristics — such as being male, white, or Christian — many variables commonly associated with social conservatism also fail to reach statistical significance. For instance, support for school vaccine mandates, feelings of financial security, and trust in government institutions all show no significant association with whether someone falls above or below our social progressivism threshold. This suggests that conventional stereotypes of social conservatives may be overly simplistic. It also raises questions about the Democratic Party’s strategy of writing off large swaths of the electorate as unwinnable — an approach that may reflect a reductive understanding of the very voters it seeks to avoid.

Regardless of what drives social conservatism, it is clear that progressive economic policies around public school spending, Social Security, minimum wage, a millionaire tax, and government health insurance resonate with a significant minority of 2020 working-class Trump voters. There are, in fact, enough of these voters to make an electoral difference — just as long as the aforementioned economic policies are the focal point of the Democratic campaign in question and the candidate is trusted to fight for those policies once in office.

The potential for this strategy to positively transform the Democratic Party is both substantial and very badly needed. The Democratic Party failed miserably in November, when Harris became the first Democratic presidential candidate to lose the popular vote since 2004. Now, six months later, the party arguably still has no plan for taking back power. This situation should force Democratic strategists to reevaluate even the most fundamental aspects of their approach. A chief concern needs to be expanding the Democratic Party’s political base. Here we’ve shown the kind of progressive economic messaging that is necessary to achieve that goal.

We have shown that 10% of working-class 2020 Trump voters hold views consistent with support for economic progressivism. If anything, this estimate is conservative, since it excludes working-class Trump voters classified as socially conservative, regardless of whether they favored progressive economic policies. Still, 10% is significant in any competitive election. With the working class comprising about 56% of 2020 Trump voters, this translates to at least 2.5% of voters nationwide that might be swayed to the Democrats’ side. This figure exceeds the margin by which Harris lost both the national popular vote as well as several key swing states.

And of course, our analysis did not address the likely even larger group of low and infrequent independent and Democratic voters — overwhelmingly working-class, supportive of key progressive economic policies, and less socially progressive than typical Democrats — who would also find an economic populist policy agenda appealing.

The time is now for the Democratic Party to abandon business as usual. Our results give a clear path forward: running candidates with economically progressive agendas can more than make up for Harris’s shortfall. To take back power from Trump, candidates like these must become the standard-bearers of the Democratic Party going forward as it strives to win back Congress and the White House in 2026 and 2028.

Conclusion

We have presented a comprehensive analysis of the attitudes and preferences of working-class Americans, all against the backdrop of the Democratic Party’s decisive defeat in the 2024 presidential election. The relevance is clear: over the past several decades, the Democratic Party has increasingly pivoted away from the working class, leaning into a misguided assumption that they would still retain a large enough voter base to be electorally successful. Kamala Harris’s defeat proves the weakness of that assumption. The only realistic hope the Democrats have for building a political base capable of winning national elections and taking consistent control of the US Senate is to win back a significant portion of the working class. Our analysis offers insights into how this might be achieved. Our findings suggest that the Democratic Party would be wise to capitalize on the working class’s strong preference for policies that are economically egalitarian — particularly predistributive policies that involve strengthening worker rights and leverage as well as existing universal social insurance and health care programs — while deemphasizing potentially divisive social policies. Several of the economic policies we analyzed here, such as those concerning increased job security, wages, and worker power, would make a strong foundation for a successful campaign.

The right candidates for this plan are out there. And given our findings, the Democratic Party would be wise to embrace such candidates, while eschewing those politicians on its current roster that have comparably little to offer the working class. The stakes couldn’t be much higher. The second Trump term has combined authoritarian populist rhetoric with a slash-and-smash approach to the federal government that threatens to undermine democracy as we know it and can only result in a greater concentration of wealth at the top and a hollowed-out state incapable of solving our biggest national problems.

#### Dem win blocks the Golden Dome.

Cox ’25 [Rachel; May 2; defense reporter since 1998; Air & Space Forces Magazine, "General Says Commercial Space Industry is Ready for Golden Dome," https://www.airandspaceforces.com/general-says-commercial-space-industry-is-ready-for-golden-dome/]

But the Pentagon and the commercial space industry are capable of producing a successful missile defense system like Golden Dome, he said.

“It is technologically feasible,” he said. “It’ll be expensive, for sure, but we’re a wealthy nation. We could make the choice to prioritize it.”

As much as the space industry has evolved, Whiting cautioned that “there is some fragility in that defense industrial base and in that commercial space sector.”

In the past, several large companies have relied on a single subcontractor to supply critical components, which creates “a choke point for us,” Whiting said.

“Now we want to make sure that we have multiple companies that can field all the capabilities that we need,” he said. “This … is a world-leading effort for the United States and our commercial space companies, but there are some areas that we want to continue to invest in to make sure they’re as robust and resilient as possible.”

A key part of Golden Dome’s success will be developing its space-based sensor network, said Harrison, noting that the Pentagon’s Space Development Agency has already begun launching satellite prototypes to sense and track missiles from low Earth orbit.

The program’s first tranche of satellites was supposed to launch this year but is delayed. Tranche two has about 50 satellites under contract and in production.

While Golden Dome may be technologically possible, Harrison said, it might not be politically feasible. Its fate could be decided by the 2026 congressional midterm elections.

“If the House flips to the Democrats … how enthusiastic are they going to be to put extra money in the budget for Golden Dome with that name?” he said.

#### Golden Dome creates multiple scenarios for extinction---including space wars and first-strike instability.

Romaniuk ’10-3 [Scott N. and László Csicsmann; 2025; PhD international studies, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies, Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies; PhD international relations and affairs, Full Professor and Head of the Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies, Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies; Eurasia Review, "Star Wars Reimagined: Golden Dome And The Geopolitics Of Missile Defence – Analysis," https://www.eurasiareview.com/03102025-star-wars-reimagined-golden-dome-and-the-geopolitics-of-missile-defence-analysis/]

Golden Dome: Shield or Provocation?

Golden Dome represents Washington’s determination to maintain dominance in space and achieve near-absolute protection against missile threats. Yet this ambition risks fuelling instability. Undermining adversaries’ confidence in their nuclear deterrents, the system could spur a rush to develop countermeasures—hypersonic glide vehicles, penetration aids, and anti-satellite weapons—potentially driving the world back toward a level of strategic competition reminiscent of the Cold War.

Some U.S. allies, including Japan and Canada, have expressed interest in participation. While co-operation may strengthen capabilities and burden-sharing, it also reinforces perceptions of exclusive defence blocs. This risks deepening adversarial mistrust and undermining broader efforts at global stability. The system’s inspiration partly stems from Israel’s Iron Dome, which proved highly effective during Iran’s 2024 missile assault. Earlier this year, President Donald Trump stated that Canada would need to contribute US$61 billion to participate in the missile defence system ‘if they remain a separate, but unequal, Nation’. He further suggested that Canada should ‘become the 51st state’ to join Golden Dome without cost, underscoring how the programme raises complex questions of sovereignty, alliance obligations, and strategic dependence.War history books

Linking Technology and Strategy

Beyond engineering challenges, the capabilities envisioned for Golden Dome carry profound strategic consequences. The system’s potential to intercept missiles at multiple stages alters calculations of deterrence, both for allies and potential adversaries. Where traditional deterrence relied on the threat of retaliation, Golden Dome introduces the possibility of pre-emptive denial—an approach that reassures domestic audiences and partners but risks being perceived as destabilising by rival powers. Technical sophistication is thus inseparable from strategic impact: the architecture of the shield directly shapes the geopolitics it seeks to protect.

From Homeland Shield to Global Flashpoint

The reverberations of Golden Dome extend across regions and great-power rivalries. Russia and China jointly condemned the initiative as ‘deeply destabilising’, warning it undermines the principle of mutually assured destruction. China described it as having ‘strong offensive implications’, while both powers view it as an attempt to negate the balance between offensive and defensive arms.Geopolitics online course

In response, China is accelerating its anti-satellite and hypersonic programmes, with reports of a planned ‘Chinese Golden Dome’. Russia, perceiving its midcourse and terminal deterrent phases at risk, may expand the use of mobile launchers, decoys, and hypersonic glide systems. India, though not directly targeted, is advancing its Sudarshan Chakra initiative, which National Security Adviser Anil Chauhan described in August 2025 as ‘India’s own Iron Dome or Golden Dome’. European allies may welcome enhanced coverage yet face growing entanglement in U.S.–Russia and U.S.–China tensions.

The Space Dilemma

The militarisation of space presents profound risks for global security and long-term orbital sustainability. Absent robust governance frameworks, deploying armed systems in orbit erodes fragile norms, intensifies mistrust, and increases the danger of miscalculation. Dual-use technologies complicate verification, blurring the line between defensive and offensive deployments. Debris generated by weapons tests or intercepts threatens satellites vital to communications, navigation, and scientific research.

Mitigating these dangers requires co-operative governance, transparency measures, and new agreements on debris mitigation and rules of engagement. Without such measures, insecurity will fuel further militarisation, undermining both national security and the civilian benefits of space.

Strategic Risks and Operational Realism

Golden Dome confronts a host of risks. Adversaries may accelerate development of anti-satellite weapons, cyber capabilities, and countermeasures. Technology remains unproven at scale, and system integration may falter under the strain of complexity. Countermeasures such as manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles, hypersonics, or saturation strikes could overwhelm defences. Electronic warfare and cyberattacks threaten communications, while the high cost of replenishing satellites undermines sustainability. Above all, the enormous budget could drain resources from nuclear modernisation, conventional readiness, or emerging priorities such as cyber defence.War history books

Domestic and Political Dimensions

Domestically, Golden Dome’s trajectory will be shaped by politics as much as engineering. Major defence contractors—Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Boeing—stand to benefit from lucrative long-term contracts, while congressional lobbying will influence funding allocations. Public opinion may prove fickle: enthusiasm for security could wane in the face of ballooning costs or perceptions that domestic priorities are being neglected. Partisan divides remain stark, with Democrats likely to emphasise arms control and norms, while Republicans frame Golden Dome as a symbol of U.S. technological strength.

International Security Architecture

Golden Dome sits uneasily within the broader arms control framework. The U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002 paved the way for ambitious missile defence projects but weakened the principle of strategic balance. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits weapons of mass destruction in orbit but leaves conventional systems and missile defence platforms largely unregulated. Efforts such as the proposed Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) have stalled, leaving a dangerous governance vacuum. NATO allies may welcome enhanced protection yet remain wary of being drawn more deeply into U.S.–China and U.S.–Russia competition.

Escalation and Strategic Stability

Golden Dome could significantly undermine adversaries’ confidence in the survivability and effectiveness of their second-strike capabilities, a cornerstone of nuclear deterrence. By projecting the perception that U.S. missile defences could neutralise retaliatory forces, rivals may fear that their deterrent is vulnerable in a crisis, increasing the incentive to act pre-emptively to preserve strategic leverage. This mirrors classical security dilemmas: efforts to enhance one state’s defence can inadvertently intensify insecurity for others, raising the probability of miscalculation during tense standoffs.

The dual-use character of space-based assets—where sensors, satellites, and orbital platforms serve both civilian and military functions—further magnifies escalation risks. Attacks targeting these systems, even if intended as limited or defensive strikes, could be interpreted as offensive moves, triggering rapid and unpredictable responses. Civilian infrastructure essential for communications, navigation, weather monitoring, and commercial activities may become entangled in military conflict, complicating crisis management. The opacity of space operations, combined with the speed of orbital engagement and difficulty of attribution, could accelerate decision-making under uncertainty, leaving little room for de-escalation.

Economic, Ethical, and Normative Dimensions

Golden Dome threatens to fundamentally reshape U.S. defence priorities. The sheer scale of the programme implies that vast resources would be dedicated to its development, testing, and deployment, potentially diverting attention and funding from other critical areas such as nuclear triad modernisation, cyber resilience, and the readiness of conventional forces. This raises difficult questions about strategic trade-offs: investing heavily in near-absolute missile defence may come at the expense of capabilities that underpin broader national security and deterrence.

Ethically, Golden Dome raises pressing questions about the militarisation of a shared global commons. The deployment of orbital weapons—even for ostensibly defensive purposes—sets dangerous precedents, normalising weaponisation of space and potentially triggering competitive escalation. Normatively, the initiative challenges existing international frameworks that govern responsible behaviour in space. Without sustained multilateral dialogue, codified rules of conduct, and confidence-building measures, Golden Dome risks eroding the principles that ensure space remains accessible, safe, and sustainable for all states and future generations. In effect, the project is as much a test of global governance and international responsibility as it is a demonstration of technological prowess.

Shifting Regional Balances and Global Dependencies

Golden Dome’s implications extend far beyond the immediate interests of the U.S., Russia, and China, reshaping regional security dynamics and influencing strategic calculations across the globe. Its announcement signals a shift in the balance of power, compelling allies and adversaries alike to reassess their defence postures and long-term security strategies.

In the Middle East, Israel may become integrated into Golden Dome, joining a broader U.S.-led missile defence network and enhancing its already advanced capabilities while signalling alignment with American strategic priorities. Gulf states, notably Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, may seek participation to counter Iran’s expanding missile and drone arsenal, deepening military interdependence with Washington. While such involvement could strengthen regional security for allies, it risks heightening tensions with adversaries and further entrenching competing security blocs.

On the Korean Peninsula, North Korea is likely to accelerate its missile and nuclear programmes, perceiving Golden Dome as a direct challenge to its deterrent and sovereignty, and as a destabilising initiative that could heighten the risk of nuclear confrontation extending into space. South Korea may consider closer integration with U.S. missile defence systems, including potential operational coordination with orbital sensors or joint deployments. This raises critical questions about strategic autonomy, alliance obligations, and entanglement in broader great-power rivalries.

Beyond these immediate theatres, states in the Global South confront profound asymmetries. Countries lacking the technological, economic, or industrial capacity to develop comparable missile defence systems may become increasingly dependent on U.S.-led protection arrangements. Such dependency could reinforce global hierarchies of security provision, amplifying debates over sovereignty, strategic reliance, and inequality. Perceptions of exclusion may also drive secondary effects, including regional arms buildups, pursuit of asymmetric deterrence strategies, or alignment with alternative security providers, further complicating the international strategic landscape.

Guardianship and Consequence

Golden Dome is both shield and spark: a testament to U.S. technological ambition and a potential catalyst for global instability. Its technical feasibility remains uncertain, yet its impact on strategic stability, arms control, and space governance is already profound. Whether the project stabilises or destabilises will depend on both engineering breakthroughs and deliberate political choices.

### 1NC

Unions PIC:

#### President Donald J. Trump and Vice President James D. Vance, citing health concerns, should resign.

#### The United States federal government should:

#### - forswear strengthening collective bargaining rights for federal workers;

#### - substantially increase non-collective bargaining protections for federal workers;

#### - impeach and remove Presidents that contravene the prohibitions against politicizing the nonpartisan federal workforce stipulated by the Pendleton Act and/or Civil Service Reform Act;

#### - guarantee arbitration forums for workplace disputes in the federal civil service;

#### - and provide competitive wages and benefits for civil servants in comparison to private sector employees.

#### ‘Collective bargaining rights’ aren’t civil service protections. The CP competes and institutes a suite of employment reforms but avoids empowering union obstructions that ossifies the executive, which check existential threats.

Withe ’25 [Aaron; April 9; B.A. in Applied Sciences from Corban University, former member of the Washington and Oregon Advisory Committees to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, recipient of the Oregon Taxpayers Association’s Thomas Jefferson Award, CEO of the Freedom Foundation, a non-profit organization litigating over eighty cases involving public unions; The Hill, “Trump’s stance on unions is what Roosevelt wanted all along,” https://thehill.com/opinion/congress-blog/labor/5237960-trump-executive-order-union-obstruction/]

Franklin Delano Roosevelt — the architect of modern labor law and workers’ rights — wrote in 1937 that collective bargaining does not belong in the public sector.

President Trump’s executive order ending collective bargaining across national security agencies represents a return to Roosevelt’s sensible approach. The order leverages authority granted by Congress through the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 to ensure critical government functions aren’t hamstrung by union obstruction.

The urgency of this action becomes clear when examining recent history. According to the White House, since January, the Department of Veterans Affairs alone has faced 70 national and local grievances from unions, more than one per day. What’s more, when the Veterans Administration attempted to implement congressionally mandated accountability reforms, unions tried to force the reinstatement of 4,000 employees, many of whom were removed for poor performance or misconduct.

In what alternate universe can private organizations invalidate legislation passed by elected representatives?

Similar stories play out across the federal landscape. According to the Federal Labor Relations Authority, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials cannot modify cybersecurity policies without first completing time-consuming midterm bargaining with unions.

When vital agencies can’t adapt to emerging threats without union permission, national security is at risk.

Critics will argue the executive order’s definition of national security is too expansive. Unfortunately, modern threats don’t fit neatly into Cold War categories.

Energy security, cybersecurity, pandemic preparedness and economic defense all represent critical vulnerabilities adversaries can exploit. The integrated nature of these threats requires a holistic understanding of national security extending well beyond traditional military concerns.

To be sure, union supporters raise legitimate concerns that deserve serious consideration. Federal workers deserve protection from partisan purges, workplace discrimination and retaliation for whistleblowing. They’re also entitled to reasonable compensation and safe working conditions.

These are values most Americans share, regardless of political affiliation.

But collective bargaining isn’t necessary to secure these protections. Civil service safeguards predate unionization and will remain intact under Trump’s order. Merit principles, anti-discrimination laws and whistleblower statutes continue to shield workers from abuse.

All that changes is the union’s power to dictate operational decisions that elected leadership should control.

America needs a new framework that protects workers without undermining accountability. Some state reforms offer promising models, requiring annual recertification elections for unions, ensuring they maintain worker support. Other states have ended automatic dues deduction while strengthening civil service protections, effectively uncoupling worker rights from union power.

In the months before President Joe Biden left office, his administration renegotiated the collective bargaining agreements of federal agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency. This move highlights the core problem: When unelected organizations can systematically obstruct policies established by elected leadership, the government becomes less responsive to voters’ needs.

Trump’s executive order, even with its limitations, addresses a longstanding problem in federal governance. The question isn’t whether you support unions or management, but whether you believe the government should prioritize serving citizens over protecting entrenched union interests, regardless of which party controls the White House.

Our government’s effectiveness depends on resolving this tension. We need a federal workforce that combines strong protections for individual employees with the flexibility agencies need to fulfill their missions.

Only then can we achieve what both parties claim to want — a government that works for all Americans.

### 1NC

Disability K:

#### Disability is the master trope for inhumanity. Pathological line-drawing make ableism an ontological logic of elimination, manifesting in symbolic violence---that’s especially true in academic spaces like debate.

Maher ’24 [Anthony & Justin Haegele; March; Director of Research and Professor of Special Educational Needs, Disability and Inclusion in the Carnegie School of Education; professor and the director of the Center for Movement, Health and Disability in the Department of Human Movement Sciences at Old Dominion University; British Journal of Sociology of Education, “Beyond spatial materiality, towards inter- and intra-subjectivity: conceptualizing exclusion in education as internalized ableism and psycho-emotional disablement,” pp. 531-546]

We are not the first and hopefully will not be the last to explore the ways and extent to which ableism permeates the culture of education. For instance, ableism has been explored empirically in education policy and initiatives (Timberlake Citation2020), teacher education (Broderick and Lalvani Citation2017), medical education (Jain Citation2020), social work education (Kattari et al. Citation2020), art education (Penketh Citation2017) and physical education (Maher, van Rossum, and Morley Citation2023). Our conceptualization of ableism is situated in critical disability studies scholarship and influenced by the work of Fiona Kumari Campbell. According to Campbell (Citation2001, Citation2019), ableism permeates all cultural formations, including education, in that it is inextricably bound to the hegemonic ideologies, values, logics, traditions, practices, interactions and forms of representation that produce a particular kind of mind-body-self that is projected, promoted, and celebrated as perfect, species typical, and therefore essential to being considered fully human. Those individuals and groups that do not conform to this conception of ‘the human’, which according to posthuman feminist Rosi Braidotti (Citation2013) is tied to Enlightenment period ideals best represented via Di Vinci’s white, western European, nondisabled Vitruvian Man, are cast as sub- or less than-human. As such, disability is cast as ‘a diminished state of being human’ (Campbell Citation2001, 44) because disabled people, especially those that inhabit mainstream education spaces, threaten normative and ableist percepts of how the mind-body-self should think, look, move, be and become. It follows then that ableism is an intersubjective mode of symbolic power and domination (Bourdieu Citation1991) that permeates all social relations and interactions in the cultural fields of education, producing processes and systems of entitlement for nondisabled students, and oppression, marginalization, and exclusion for disabled students because they do not conform to normative expectations. According to Goodley et al. (Citation2019):

Schools [and education generally] are built upon highly regulated principles and policy discourses of individual achievement and progression. They are inherently individualistic and reward the entrepreneurial achievements of self-governing learners. The school is a literal and metaphorical ableist playground (p. 987).

As such, ableist educational systems, and hegemonic logics relating to policy construction and enactment, curriculum, pedagogy, and assessment, act as what Antonio Gramsci called mechanisms of cultural (re)production (Hoare and Nowell-Smith Citation1971) by contributing towards creating hierarchized notions of the mind-body-self through the ‘differentiation, ranking, negation, notification, and prioritization of sentient life’ (Campbell Citation2019, 287–288). We see this most starkly through the Neoliberal performative culture of schools that is perpetuated through high stakes testing, league tables, state-orchestrated inspections (such as Ofsted in the UK), curriculum, and teacher education (see Apple Citation2017; Ball Citation2016). Such Neoliberal performative cultures shape perceptions of cognition and corporeality and thus the construction of legitimate forms of ability-related capital. Students who are positioned and perceived as possessing such capital are privileged over others. Too often, hegemonic beliefs about capital are based on normative perceptions of how the (able) mind-body-self should think, look, and move, thus resulting in many disabled students and some with special educational needs experiencing what Bourdieu (Citation1991) considered symbolic violence because, according to empirical research conducted by Goodley et al. (Citation2019), Lynch, Simon, and Maher (Citation2023) and Maher, van Rossum, and Morley (Citation2023), their cognitive and corporeal abilities are judged negatively and thus subordinated through an able-mind/body gaze. In this regard, the able-mind/body gaze infiltrates associated practices that work to police and regulate nonnormative mind-body-selves by, empirical research by Maher, van Rossum, and Morley (Citation2023) suggests, using normative tools for assessing learning, learner progress and learner achievement as a way of reinforcing ableist normalcy.

According to Wolbring (Citation2008), ableism is so pervasive that it manifests as common-sense cultural ideologies and discourses underpinning taken-for-granted logics and thus is considered ‘the natural’ or ‘common sense’ way of being (in schools). So much so, in fact, that ableism becomes internalized; that is, it shapes the individual and collective habitus or personality structure (Elias Citation1978). It can be said, therefore, that ableism is structural, cultural, intersubjective, intrasubjective, and psycho-emotional in nature (Reeve Citation2020). Disabled young people are not immune to the internalization of ableist modes of thinking, doing and being, which act as a form of exclusion because they can lead to psycho-emotional disablement by impacting negatively on their self-esteem, self-confidence, mental health, and general well-being because they attempt, and often fail, to hold themselves to often unrealistic ableist thresholds (Reeve Citation2020). Hence, it is crucial that ableism-critical perspectives are utilized to disrupt, dislodge, and transform hegemonic ideologies, discourses, and practices that subordinate the nonnormative mind-body-self because of the negative consequences it can have for their sense of self and personhood. We hope that this article, which centers the lived, embodied experiences of disabled students to conceptualize exclusion as inter- and intra-subjective experiences of internalized ableism and psycho-emotional disablement, contributes in some small way to that cause.

Exclusion as internalized ableism and psycho-emotional disablement

Much of the work done by sociologists and disability scholars has been anchored to a social understanding of disability and thus focused on challenging spatial forms of exclusion to improve the material and social conditions of disabled people, especially in relation to access, opportunities and participation in education, employment, and housing (Oliver Citation2013). Far less attention has been given, however, to exploring exclusion as inter- and intra-subjective experiences that impacts the psycho-emotional wellbeing of disabled people, especially disabled students. For many disability and disabled scholars, this neglect is tied to a reluctance to personalize disability for fear of stoking the individual, medical, pathological, deficit and tragedy discursive fires that have been (and still are) bound to disability (Shakespeare Citation1994). Nonetheless, rather than thinking about disability as being external to the individual and collective, our thinking aligns with that of Shakespeare (Citation1994) and Braidotti (Citation2013) who contest that the (disabled)mind-body-self is a bio-psycho-social-cultural-political entity that is neither inherently good or bad, but instead exists and has meanings ascribed to it in the different material and social spaces that it inhabits. It is for these reasons that we explore how the structural forces that shape material and social spaces, whether that be segregated, integrated, or mainstream, influence how disability and exclusion are lived, embodied, and felt.

For us, the first component of exclusion as an inter- and intra-subjective experience is the lived, felt, and embodied experience of psycho-emotional disablement. Our conceptualization of psycho-emotional disablement is inspired by, but not anchored to, the work of Carol Thomas (Citation2001, Citation1999) and Donna Reeve (Citation2020, Citation2004, Citation2002). The genesis of psycho-emotional disablement as a tool to think with, make sense of and construct meaning about inter- and intra-subjectivities of disability is tied to Thomas’ (re)wording of the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation’s (UPIAS, 1978) definition of disability. Thomas developed the UPIAS’s definition to include a focus on the impact of disablism on psycho-emotional wellbeing:

Disablism is a form of social oppression involving the social imposition of restrictions of activity on people with impairments and the socially engendered undermining of their psycho-emotional well-being (2007, 73).

According to Reeve (Citation2020), psycho-emotional disablement is both structural and interactional in nature, thus meaning it can be experienced indirectly or directly. For instance, the natural and built contours of a school can restrict access to material and social spaces if lifts, ramps, or electronic doors are not installed or in good working condition. Moreover, government, local council and school funding models may limit the services and provision that teachers are able to use, regardless of integrated or segregated space or place, to meet the needs and abilities of some disabled students. For example, a lack of learning assistant support, or even limited access to colour overlays or low vision aids because of financial pressures, can impact detrimentally on disabled students’ experiences of school and thus their psycho-emotional wellbeing. Finally, but by no means lastly, school curriculums and assessment arrangements may be normatively standardized and thus not appropriate to meet the needs and abilities of some disabled students. All these structural issues, which are shaped by those with their hands on the levers of power in government and education, none of whom disabled children will have met or even know, work to disable some disabled students, elicit or support feelings of exclusion, and impact negatively on their psycho-emotional wellbeing (Reeve Citation2020). Indeed, inaccessible material and social spaces, limited specialized services and resources, and poorly designed curriculum and assessments are forms of symbolic violence (Bourdieu Citation1991) that are exercised upon disabled students, making them feel that they are out of place, part of an undesirable and unwanted minority, and more of a burden than an asset (Haegele and Maher Citation2022; Reeve Citation2020). It is here where our conceptualization of exclusion extends beyond materiality, and thinks more so about the feelings, subjectivities, and psycho-emotional wellbeing experienced by disabled people. In other words, structural forms of oppression can impact negatively on the ways and extent to which disabled students feel that they belong, are accepted and are valued in the material and social spaces that their mind-body-selves inhabit (Haegele and Maher Citation2022).

Together with indirect, structural forms of oppression, we conceptualize exclusion as direct, interactional, and thus intersubjective forms of psycho-emotional disablement. We tie this to Shakespeare’s (Citation1994) and Hughes’ (Citation2007) work on the ‘disavowal of disability’. For Shakespeare (Citation1994), disavowal of disability is the projection of unwanted fears about mortality, dying and physicality onto disabled people and is thus inextricably tied to what Shildrick (Citation2020) calls the psycho-emotional framework of ableism. For us, it is a clear indicator of the ableism that saturates the culture of schools and thus the interactions that shape the material and social spaces within them (Campbell Citation2019; Goodley et al. Citation2019). The disavowal of disability manifests in the everyday micro-interactions – what Campbell (Citation2001) calls the microaggressions – that disabled students have with all of those who are part of their relational networks in schools, such as teachers, support staff and same aged-peers. Being stared at, laughed at, talked about, and even not talked to are all examples of the everyday symbolic violence (Bourdieu Citation1991) experienced by disabled students that can lead to feelings of exclusion and (ontological) invalidation. It is perhaps (un)surprising to know that disabled students are much more likely to experience bullying, both physical and symbolic, when compared to their nondisabled same-aged peers (Jessup et al. Citation2018; Ktenidis Citation2022). Such bullying is indicative of the symbolic power (Bourdieu Citation1991) that can result in marginalization and ostracization and, accordingly, mean that feelings of belonging, acceptance, and values are difficult to come by (Haegele and Maher, Citation2022; Slee, Citation2019). In fact, inter- and intra-subjective feelings of marginalization have been identified through empirical research as a threat to fundamental psychological needs of belonging and self-esteem for youth (Crouch et al. Citation2014) to a stronger degree than forms of physical bullying (Benton, 2011). Marginalization and ostracization can, according to empirical research conducted by Eisenberger and Lieberman (Citation2004) and Kawamoto, Ura, and Nittono (Citation2015), be intersubjectively experienced as social pain. Defined as a distressing experience arising from the perception of actual or potential psychological distance from social groups or close others (Eisenberger and Cole Citation2012), social pain is inextricably tied to group power dynamics and social interactions and relationships and has been shown through research to share neural similarities with physical pain (Eisenberger and Lieberman Citation2004). Over time, microaggressions and experiences of social pain build as a critical mass to impact negatively on the psycho-emotional wellbeing of disabled students (Reeve Citation2020). The negative effects of social pain on mental health and well-being are well-established in empirical research, where social pain has been linked to a range of deleterious psychological health indices, such as depression, anxiety, and reduced life satisfaction (e.g. Liu and Alloy Citation2010).

#### Labor protections entrench capitalist labor-normativity, commodify disability, and exclude those deemed precarious from social life.

Smilges ’23 [Logan; 2023; Assistant professor of English language and literatures at the University of British Columbia; Crip Negativity, “Life Strike,” p. 57-60]

Bringing questions about disability and labor together, as a life strike does, is a well-established practice in the disability community. Labor politics have been at the center of disability activism in the United States since the latter’s inception. As I describe in the first chapter, much of the impetus behind the disability rights movement in the 1970s was to advance educational and career opportunities for disabled people, thereby providing more accessible pathways to enter the workforce. As Tanya Aho argues, however, disability’s labor politics have historically done less to radicalize either labor or the category of disability than it has to produce variations of “labor-normativity” that domesticate the disabled citizen through waged work. Labor-normativity instrumentalizes the language of access and accessibility to secure disabled people’s employment “as a driving force of one’s life, a significant site of identity construction, and the major influence on one’s life cycle, daily rhythm, and imagined future” (2017, 322). By consistently centering issues of labor access and workplace accessibility without attending to the violence of labor-normativity, much of disability rights activism has embraced labor-living as necessary to our liberal citizenship and to our legibility as subjects.

Despite the importance of securing equitable opportunities and protections for disabled workers, we cannot forget that neither opportunities nor protections within neoliberal capitalism address the fundamental problem of liberal humanism—the true target of crip negativity’s bad feelings. Regardless of the efforts we make toward more and better jobs for disabled people, it remains the case that labor-normativity is designed to produce labor-living; that is, to induct disabled people into a socioeconomic system that disguises labor as life. This disguise works effectively so long as some forms of difference can be recuperated as marketable commodities while others continue to mark fungible populations for targeted debilitation. In the context of disability, access to labor cannot be achieved under capitalism without crystalizing the boundaries around the category of disability. Such crystallization ultimately obfuscates people’s crip labor, which does not aid the means of production, and further ossifies the disposability of people living on or beyond the margins of disability. In other words, it becomes more difficult to adduce the debilitating, stratified violence of labor-living when laboring itself is cited as evidence only of a person’s successful rehabilitation into social and civic life. How can we recognize when life isn’t working, for ourselves or others, if work is meant to make life worth living?

Unfortunately, answering this question becomes all the more challenging when we begin to unpack the layers of labor-normativity that have come to structure the scope and terms of contemporary disability politics. Some layers are relatively easy to parse, such as those commercialized variations of disability activism that trade in representation and visibility. A recent Victoria’s Secret ad campaign featuring multiple disabled models comes to mind (Miranda 2022). Efforts such as these are typically engineered to demonstrate a company’s or institution’s inclusivity by displaying disabled workers (e.g., lingerie models) or by acknowledging disabled people as a contingent of consumers (e.g., lingerie buyers). Bestowed with the capacity to both produce and consume, labor-normativity suggests, disabled people can effectively fold themselves into the social citizenship of neoliberal capitalism.

Other layers of labor-normativity can be trickier to identify. Consider, for instance, the forms of disability advocacy that aim to broaden the horizon of employment opportunities for disabled people (Owen and Harris 2012). Since many welfare programs, excluding the dramatically underfunded Supplemental Security Income (SSI), require a current or recent employment record, disabled people are often forced to compete for unsafe and underpaid jobs. Even with antidiscrimination laws in place, many disabled people struggle to find work, especially work that is relevant to their passions and interests. As a result, those who do secure employment wind up hesitant to raise concerns about the conditions of their labor for fear of retaliation (Kumar, Sonpal, and Hiranandani 2012). Expanding employment opportunities promises to alleviate the pressure placed onto disabled workers to settle for undesirable jobs, and it shifts the burden of competition to employers, encouraging them to improve working conditions to attract and retain employees. Within this framework, the law of supply and demand is reappropriated to demonstrate a demand for work among disabled people with the hopes of stimulating a rise in the supply of accessible and desirable jobs.

The problem with reappropriating the law of supply and demand is that it acquiesces to capitalism as a necessary condition for achieving equity for disabled people. As Nirmala Erevelles argues, creating more jobs neglects to address the fact that access to waged work is an individual solution to a systemic problem. Increasing employment opportunities may extend social citizenship to some disabled people, but it also reinforces the contingence of social citizenship on employment—a contingence that capitalism weaponizes against the most vulnerable populations. Under capitalism, there will never be enough work to go around; labor must remain competitive. Those individuals deemed least likely to aid in “the accumulation of profit,” which generally include people with intellectual disabilities, folks with limited access to education, people with a history of incarceration, and undocumented people, will never be offered safe and reliable employment—at least, not until another fungible population comes to take their place (2002, 19). People occupying this category of state-sponsored precarity become “immaterial citizens” whose primary function is to bear the brunt of capitalism’s failures (21). Since it is an essential condition of capitalism that demand outpace supply, an entire class of individuals must remain out of work in order for the total supply of jobs to remain lower than the demand for them. The resulting, requisite class of nonworkers is not only blamed for failing to fulfill their civic-qua-consumer responsibilities under neoliberalism but also strategically excluded from social citizenship in order to preserve the currency of citizenship itself.

Efforts to improve employment opportunities for disabled people are steeped in the rhetoric of integrative access that fuels labor normativity. Entrance to the workforce only appears liberatory in a context in which labor remains a metric for human valuation. It seems to me that the most productive—by which I mean politically generative—relationship between disability and labor is one that refuses to be such a metric. Rather than wedging the category of disability into neoliberalism as a meager modification to capitalism, it is worth asking whether disability might launch a more fundamental challenge to labor-normativity. What if there were a crip labor politics that cared less about disabled people’s employment or employability than about cripping labor and interrogating the ableist conditions under which labor-living is rendered quotidian?

#### Voting neg endorses an ethics of conviviality. Being open to the possibility of self-annihilation re-conceives the terms of over-determined futurism.

Puar ’10 [Jasbir; October; Professor and Graduate Director of Women's and Gender Studies at Rutgers University; Women & Performance: a journal of feminist theory, “Prognosis time: Towards a geopolitics of affect, debility and capacity,” vol. 19]

Out of the numerous possibilities that ‘‘assemblage theory’’ offers, much of it has already begun to transform queer theory, from Elizabeth Grosz’s crucial re-reading of the relations between bodies and prosthetics (which complicates not only the contours of bodies in relation to forms of bodily discharge, but also complicates the relationships to objects, such as cell phones, cars, wheelchairs, and the distinctions between them as capacity-enabling devices) (1994), to Donna Haraway’s cyborgs (1991), to Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘‘BwO’’ (Bodies without Organs – organs, loosely defined, rearranged against the presumed natural ordering of bodily capacity) (1987). I want to close by foregrounding the analytic power of conviviality that may further complicate how subjects are positioned, underscoring instead more fluid relations between capacity and debility. Conviviality, unlike notions of resistance, oppositionality, subversion or transgression (facets of queer exceptionalism that unwittingly dovetail with modern narratives of progress in modernity), foregrounds categories such as race, gender, and sexuality as events – as encounters – rather than as entities or attributes of the subject. Surrendering certain notions of revolution, identity politics, and social change – the ‘‘big utopian picture’’ that Massumi complicates in the opening epigraph of this essay – conviviality instead always entails an ‘‘experimental step.’’ Why the destabilization of the subject of identity and a turn to affect matters is because affect – as a bodily matter – makes identity politics both possible and yet impossible. In its conventional usage, conviviality means relating to, occupied with, or fond of feasting, drinking, and good company – to be merry, festive, together at a table, with companions and guests, and hence, to live with. As an attribute and function of assembling, however, conviviality does not lead to a politics of the universal or inclusive common, nor an ethics of individuatedness, rather the futurity enabled through the open materiality of bodies as a Place to Meet. We could usefully invoke Donna Haraway’s notion of ‘‘encounter value’’ here, a ‘‘becoming with’’ companionate (and I would also add, incompanionate) species, whereby actors are the products of relating, not pre-formed before the encounter (2008, 16). Conviviality is an ethical orientation that rewrites a Levinasian taking up of the ontology of the Other by arguing that there is no absolute self or other,15 rather bodies that come together and dissipate through intensifications and vulnerabilities, insistently rendering bare the instability of the divisions between capacity-endowed and debility-laden bodies. These encounters are rarely comfortable mergers but rather entail forms of eventness that could potentially unravel oneself but just as quickly be recuperated through a restabilized self, so that the political transformation is invited, as Arun Saldhana writes, through ‘‘letting yourself be destabilized by the radical alterity of the other, in seeing his or her difference not as a threat but as a resource to question your own position in the world’’ (2007, 118). Conviviality is thus open to its own dissolution and self-annihilation and less interested in a mandate to reproduce its terms of creation or sustenance, recognizing that political critique must be open to the possibility that it might disrupt and alter the conditions of its own emergence such that it is no longer needed – an openness to something other than what we might have hoped for. This is my alternative approach to Lee Edelman’s No Future, then, one that is not driven by rejecting the figure of the child as the overdetermined outcome of ‘‘reproductive futurism’’ (2004),16 but rather complicates the very terms of the regeneration of queer critique itself. Thus the challenge before us is how to craft convivial political praxis that does not demand a continual reinvestment in its form and content, its genesis or its outcome, the literalism of its object nor the direction of its drive.

## Adv---Administration

### Admin State---1NC

#### Admin state fails---it’s plagued by a laundry list of institutional issues----insufficient contestation, competition, AND diversity.

Lofthouse ’24 [Jordan and Alexander Schaefer; November 18; Program Director of Academic & Student Programs, a Senior Fellow with the F. A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, and a Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University; Assistant Professor of Philosophy at The University at Buffalo; Public Choice, “Expert knowledge and the administrative state,” vol. 202]

In our view, most arguments for expanded administrative power have not adequately considered the epistemic properties of the administrative state. In several ways, the modern administrative state delivers a deficient epistemic ecosystem, one which fails to generate and utilize expert knowledge effectively. Our analysis in this section highlights three crucial features of successful epistemic environments: contestation, competition, and diversity. Many of today’s administrative agencies lack one or more of those features, undermining the reliability of expert guidance within them.

Of course, not all policies emanating from administrative agencies are failures, and experts sometimes craft successful and socially productive policies.11 Nevertheless, the list of failures in administrative agencies is long and varied. Even with rigorous academic training, experts often offer poor advice and fail to reason well. The (un)reliability of expert judgment, however, is not exogenous to the debate about political institutions and, therefore, not something we must accept passively. Instead, the (un)reliability of experts is, in part, determined endogenously by the institutional framework itself. Steps can be taken to reform the institutional framework, a topic we explore in section 4. This line of thinking builds on recent work regarding the limitations of expert knowledge and the dangers of misidentifying market failures (see Leeson, 2022; Leeson et al., 2020).

The remainder of this section explains why current institutional arrangements provide poor conditions for assembling reliable expert judgments and putting them into effect. The modern administrative state tends to centralize, monopolize, and homogenize the provision of expert knowledge, thereby reducing the ability of public policymakers to address social problems effectively or learn from past mistakes.

3.1 Lack of contestation in centralized bureaucracies

In terms of public administration, contestation refers to the ability of dissenters to challenge proposed policies, rules, interpretations, or actions. At the limit, the ability to contest something involves the right to veto it, but more modest forms of contestation likewise are possible. To contest something, an agent must be able to (1) access it, that is, learn about it, (2) introduce friction to its acceptance or implementation, that is, increase the length of time over which deliberations are held or to expand the number of issues to be considered, and (3) enjoy protections that limit the costs that the agent incurs during the period of contestation. Contestation, as a feature of organizations, is satisfied only when a sufficiently large number of agents can contest agency decisions.

Contestation serves an indispensable epistemic function. As Christiano (2012: p. 28) puts it, “disagreement is not only inevitable; it is normally quite fruitful in that it challenges the assumptions and dogmas of fallible human beings.” Various empirical studies support Christiano’s claim by showing that individual thinkers, in the absence of contestation, perform poorly on basic cognitive tasks. After introducing contestation in an interactive setting, however, reasoning skills improve markedly (Trouche et al., 2014, 2016, 2019). Mercier and Sperber (2017: p. 235) summarize the relevant studies:

When people reason on their own, they mostly produce reasons that support their decisions or their preconceived ideas, and they don’t bother to make sure that the reasons are strong.… [N]ot only is the solitary use of reason unlikely to correct mistaken intuitions, but it might even make things worse.

Only when agents are confronted with external criticisms do individuals exert the cognitive effort required to produce strong arguments and check their conclusions.12

Several reasons can be found for thinking that the typical administrative bureaucracy is an inadequate venue for contestation. First, because decision procedures within administrative agencies often take place far away from where they will be implemented, access (the first requirement of contestation) is constrained tightly. It is costly for citizens in Michigan, for example, to be involved in Washington-centric deliberations about a new environmental regulation that will affect the auto industry.13

Second, and relatedly, because many agencies are “independent,” policy decisions are insulated from democratic processes.14 In the United States, independent federal agencies were designed specifically to operate beyond the direct control of the president or the 15 executive branch departments, meaning that they do not report directly to elected officials. Examples of independent agencies include the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Consequently, friction (the second requirement) is inadequate for those influential bureaus.

Finally, experts who contribute to administrative decision-making often face high costs of dissenting from the majority, violating the third requirement of contestation. Those costs might include lower prospects for promotion, budget cuts for the dissenting bureaucrat’s favored projects, social disapprobation, and limited discretion, among others. While such costs may be encountered in any decision-making body, the costs of dissension are exacerbated in the administrative state because its agencies, as the premier employers of talent in various fields, enjoy a degree of monopsony power. As Koppl (2018: p. 214) explains, under conditions of monopsony, “even nominally competing experts [are] dependent on the monopsonist and correspondingly unwilling to give opinions that might be contrary to the monopsonist's interests or wishes.” When decisions in a particular policy area are issued by a large, centralized agency, outside employment options are restricted and jobs often less desirable, largely because the public sector offers more generous pension and healthcare benefits than the private sector typically does.

Of course, administrative agencies often do engage in deliberative procedures, and doing so almost certainly increases the quality of their decisions. For example, the notice-and-comment period for certain types of proposed regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act is one way of establishing a deliberative procedure. But that is by no means true of all administrative decisions, and, in the most centralized agencies, procedures are characterized by restricted access, limited friction, and limited protections for would-be contesters.15 That said, different agencies follow different procedures, and some administrative agencies feature more access, less friction, and offer more protections to dissenters than others. The most centralized and insulated agencies, such as the Federal Reserve, allow very little contestation. Other departments or agencies may be subject to more contestation. The U.S. Department of Education, for example, shares decision-making responsibilities with state governments and local school boards.

In sum, because of its importance as a design principle for enhancing the epistemic ecosystem, we propose that political organizations generally should foster decision-making processes that support the ability of many parties to access the content of the reasoning and conclusions, to introduce friction to the process of deliberating and drawing conclusions, and to enjoy protection from potential retaliation when doing so.16

3.2 Lack of competition in centralized bureaucracies

The term competition refers to the availability of alternative sources of information, judgments, or policies. Competition is enhanced to the extent that there exist a greater variety of options and a lower cost of switching between them. Policymakers are subject to competitive pressures only when their constituents have viable alternatives (Tiebout, 1956; Ostrom et al., 1961; Hirschmann, 1970; Lemke, 2016).

In a market setting, competition serves to provide information to firms that helps them make efficient production decisions. When certain inputs become scarce, their prices rise, causing firms to substitute away from these inputs. Moreover, as firms compete among themselves, those that provide goods and services that consumers demand at higher quality or lower costs will profit, and those that do not will incur losses. Thus, the market process also serves as a filtering mechanism, rewarding effective producers and punishing firms that pursue wasteful projects.

More generally, in situations that are highly complex and information poor—or what Hogarth et al. (2015) call wicked learning environments—competition provides a useful method of searching for solutions. If a problem is complex, then the search space of solutions is vast, and good solutions cannot be reliably ascertained before intensive research and experimentation. Exploring the solution space in a reasonable timeframe thus calls for decentralized experimentation, as well as some feedback mechanism for scaling up successful solutions and filtering out unsuccessful ones.17 Put differently, finding adequate solutions to complex problems requires parallel search procedures (D’Agostino, 2009): several teams employing different methods and experimenting with diverse solutions. Without parallel search procedures, it is impossible to explore an adequate number of solutions within a reasonable timeframe, and the solution selected will likely be subpar. Competition supports parallel search procedures, making it an effective response to wicked learning environments.

By contrast, the guidance and policies provided by the administrative state verge on being monopolistic, since they typically implement a single policy on a nationwide scale.18 As DeCanio (2021: p. 202) explains, “administrative states face no rival organization with the authority to produce legally binding rules that are compulsory for all members of its geographically defined territory.”19 As a result, these agencies do not receive the kind of feedback required for a process of learning to occur in a wicked environment. Administrative agencies do not earn profits when they make wise decisions or suffer losses when they make incorrect ones.20 Nor can they pick up or lose subscribers because of their decisions. Without such feedback, these bureaucracies lack direct signals about how their choices affect the people they are meant to govern. This “lack of options,” Tarko (2021: p. 184) argues, “hampers both the ability of citizens to express and reveal their preferences and the ability of the public administration to receive feedback.”

Cost-benefit analysis, a major aspect of Sunstein and Heath’s defense of the administrative state, can address this issue—but only to a limited extent. When considering the issue of efficiency, the relevant question is not whether a policy produces a net surplus of benefits, but whether it provides the largest net surplus of benefits when compared to alternative feasible policies.21 When it comes to answering this question, the monopolistic nature of administrative agencies poses a severe epistemic problem. As DeCanio (2021) notes, it is impossible to assess the efficiency of government policies due to the lack of a counterfactual control group. When an agency has a large geographic monopoly on policy provision, then there is unlikely to be a comparable jurisdiction that did not implement that policy. Social scientists thus lack a useful “what if?” scenario for comparison (DeCanio, 2021: p. 207). This diminishes the ability of experts to evaluate the effectiveness of their policy prescriptions, thus undermining the reliability of expert judgment.

The key to generating and harnessing expert knowledge is to place experts in a competitive environment where they can learn from successes and failures—both their own and those of competing experts. The current situation prevents feedback from consumers, as well as reliable causal inference, from informing the decisions and policies set by experts. Far from leveraging the insights of experts, the current organization of the administrative state blinds them to the effects of their policies by allowing agencies to monopolize their respective policy areas.

3.3 Lack of diversity in centralized bureaucracies

There are several useful ways of defining diversity (Page, 2011: pp. 16–24), but for our purposes an organization is diverse when its members, taken together, exhibit a relatively high degree of diversity in their perspectives.22 When an organization exhibits a diverse array of perspectives, that is, individuals with different information, as well as different ways of framing, organizing, and evaluating that information, that organization exhibits perspectival diversity. By contrast, an institutional framework is diverse when it encompasses a variety of different organizations experimenting with alternative sets of policies or rules. When an institutional environment exhibits diversity between different policy packages, it exhibits what we will call institutional diversity.

The epistemic importance of diversity is difficult to overstate. As Roger Koppl (2018:205) puts it, “multiplicity is not enough. [Experts] must be different from one another.” Without a diversity of perspectives, the weak points or blind spots of deliberators will go uncorrected; group think will flourish and expert failure will result. Hong and Page (2001, 2004) have provided mathematical theorems, agent-based models, and laboratory evidence that demonstrate the existence of a “diversity bonus” when it comes to solving difficult problems. In situations of complex problem solving, the benefits of diversity are so pronounced that they often outweigh the benefits of expertise, meaning that groups of diverse non-experts will outperform homogenous groups of experts. Further work has shown that these results are robust under various assumptions (Hankins et al., 2023; Singer, 2019).

Philosophers working in the fields of social epistemology and political philosophy make similar claims. As Christiano (2012: p. 49) puts it,

[I]t is only when all the different sectors of society have the means of articulating their diverse points of view that social science can generate a process of knowledge production that is sensitive to the conditions of all the different parts of society. Under these conditions social science can generate a competitive struggle of ideas that can ensure that the process of social science is responsive to a lot of different sources of evidence.23

Reliable judgment and effective learning require feedback from a broad range of different stakeholders, including those outside the boardroom of some specialized administrative agency.

For a variety of reasons, administrative agencies often exhibit low levels of diversity. Most importantly, experts at a given agency are typically drawn from a specific discipline and therefore share certain professional interests, which may, consciously or unconsciously, distort the quality of the information they provide (Thomas, 2019).24 “[B]eliefs and science,” Christiano (2012: p. 49) warns, “can easily come to reflect the narrow backgrounds and interests of those who produce them.” Along similar lines, Myrdal ([1930] 1954) has argued that theoretical perspectives, such as neoclassical economics, often come laden with ideological presuppositions.25 The risk of such distortion is much higher when deliberation occurs without transparency or citizen participation (Zenker, 2011). This leads to theoretical frameworks in which certain values or interests are implicitly favored. All of these issues present a legitimate cause for worry, since they diminish the reliability of experts. Christensen et al., (2022: p. 70) argue that “when expert advice does not cover all relevant aspects of and perspectives on an issue, but rather reflects specific disciplinary viewpoints, citizens are right to worry about the quality of advice and poorer quality of policy and outcomes.”

Not only do administrative agencies draw in experts from a particular discipline, but they often focus on a particular, narrow issue and valorize one particular approach to that issue. For example, employees of the Federal Reserve share the same understanding of macroeconomic fluctuations and the Fed’s role in the economy, even though this is not true of the profession at large. The relative lack of diversity leaves the Fed vulnerable to groupthink and incapable of grasping insights that may improve their policies. In the lead up to the 2008 financial crisis, for example, several economists —including Nouriel Roubini (International Monetary Fund, 2006), Raghuramn Rajan (2005), and Ann Pettifor (2006)—published papers or books warning that increasing private debt threatened to destabilize the economy. None of the economists at the Fed issued such warnings or appear to have seriously considered the possibility of a financial crisis until far too late. Many decisions at the Federal Reserve leading up to 2008 seem to have suffered from insufficient input from diverse perspectives.26

Not only does the administrative state include many agencies that fail to incorporate sufficiently diverse perspectives, it also exhibits an insufficiently diverse institutional framework. By occupying a dominant place in the provision of public policy and information, large administrative agencies crowd out competing sources that might employ experts from alternative fields who utilize distinct methods. This dimension of diversity is closely related to competition, since encouraging diversity in the institutional framework usually requires different agencies to develop alternative policy solutions.

### Governance---1NC

#### Governance fails---outdated, bogged down, and too complex.

Ferry ’18 [Jean; October 2018; nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, professor at Sciences Po Paris; Policy Contribution, “Should we give up on global governance?” Iss. 17]

Although the previous argument primarily rests on the broad pattern of international trade and finance, the adverse effects of external liberalisation can be compounded by inadequate governance. As far as trade is concerned, two cases in point are, first, inertia in the categorisation of countries, especially the fact that emerging countries, including China, still enjoy developing country status in the WTO; and, second, failures to enforce the adequate protection of intellectual property (an issue on which the EU recently joined the US and filed a complaint at the WTO against Chinese practices; see European Union, 2018). These grievances, and others concerning subsidies or investment, are not new: they were clearly spelled out by policymakers from the Obama administration (see for example, Schwab, 2011, and Wu, 2016). The underlying concern is that the systemic convergence on a market economy template that was expected from participation in the WTO has failed to materialise. The rules and institutions of global trade have brought shallow convergence but not the deeper alignment of economic systems that was hoped for.

More generally, existing rules and institutions were conceived for a different world. This is very apparent in the trade field: the GATT/WTO framework dates from what Baldwin (2016) has called the “first unbundling” of production and consumption. They were not designed for the “second unbundling” of knowledge and production that gave rise to the emergence of global value chains. For decades, the implicit assumption behind the structure of trade negotiations has been that nations have well-defined sectoral trade interests: they are either exporters or importers. But in a world of global value chains, they are both importers and exporters of similar products simultaneously. Even if the principles of multilateralism remain valid, important features of the rules and institutions in which they are embedded are increasingly outdated.

In the same way, opening to capital movements was supposed to result in net financial flows from savings-rich to savings-poor countries. What has happened instead is a massive increase in gross flows resulting in the interpenetration of financial systems and the coexistence of sizeable external assets and liabilities. The consequence has been the emergence of a global financial cycle (see for example Rey, 2017) and of policy dilemmas that are quite different from those arising in a simple Mundell-Fleming framework, in which interdependence takes place through net inflows and outflows of capital.

Developments in the climate field further illustrate the point. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol was negotiated under the assumption that the bulk of greenhouse gas emissions would continue to originate in the advanced countries. But by the time the Protocol was meant to enter into force, it was clear already that the hypothesis was deeply wrong. The exemption of developing countries from emissions reductions was one of the reasons why the US did not ratify the treaty. The failed Copenhagen agreement of 2009 was an attempt to replicate Kyoto on a global scale, but there was no consensus for such an approach.

Rules can be reformed and institutions can adapt. But this is a long and demanding process, especially when it requires unanimity, when participating countries have diverging interests and when changes require ratification by parliaments where there is no majority to support them. Global rules therefore exhibit a strong inertia that often prevents necessary adaptations. Trade rules, amendments to which require unanimity, are a case in point.

Institutions are nimbler and can adapt to changing priorities or perspectives on interdependence. The IMF for example has succeeded in adjusting to major changes in the international economic regime and major shifts in the intellectual consensus. But even institutions face limitations to their ability to keep up with underlying transformations. This is one of the reasons why solutions to emerging problems have often been looked for outside the existing multilateral, institution-based governance framework (Table 1).

<<TABLE 1 OMITTED>>

D. The imbalances of global governance

A further reason for popular dissatisfaction with global governance is its unbalanced nature. The deeper international integration becomes, the broader the scope of policy its management should cover, and the more acute the tension between the technical requirements of global interdependence and the domestically-rooted legitimacy of public policies. This is most apparent in the field of taxation. International tax optimisation by multinationals has become an issue of significant relevance and it is estimated that 40 percent of their profit is being artificially shifted to low-tax countries – with major consequences for national budgets (Tørsløv et al, 2018). But the fact that taxation remains at the core of sovereign prerogatives limits the scope and ambition of initiatives conducted at international level. The result, which can be regarded as an illustration of Rodrik’s trilemma, is that global coordination in tax matters falls short of what equity-conscious citizens regard as desirable and, at the same time, exceeds what sovereignty-conscious citizens consider acceptable.

The imbalances of global governance are by no means limited to the taxation field. The same can be found in a series of domains, for example biodiversity and the preservation of nature.

E. Increased complexity

The final obstacle to multilateral solutions has to do with the sheer complexity of the challenges global governance has to tackle. In recent decades channels of international interdependence have both multiplied and diversified. They now link together countries with significantly differing levels of technical, economic or financial development. Because they have developed outside the scope of negotiated rules and established institutions, some of channels of interdependence also escape the reach of international agreements to an unprecedented degree. This is especially, but not only, the case of the internet and the multiple networks that rely on it. The world does not fit anymore the usual representation whereby individual nations trade goods, capital and technology. Even putting aside geopolitical consequences and assuming a shared commitment to openness and multilateral solutions, such complexity is bound to test the limits of existing international governance arrangements.

### Foreign Policy---1NC

#### No impact to Trump foreign policy---he won’t escalate, but unpredictability dampens aggression.

Ansel ’25 [Frederic; April 12; doctorate from the Center for Geopolitical Analysis and Research of the University of Paris, teaches international relations and political science at the Paris Business School; Fakti.bg, "Rumors of World War III are greatly exaggerated," https://fakti.bg/en/mnenia/963588-rumors-of-world-war-iii-are-greatly-exaggerated]

L"EXPRESS: Donald Trump seems to have his eye on the Nobel Peace Prize in his attempt to impose a ceasefire in Ukraine. But isn't he a risk factor for global stability because of his unpredictability?

FR. ANSEL: One of the directions of his policy in international relations, besides mercantilism, is the refusal to send American troops beyond national borders. This automatically reduces the risk of military clashes between American troops and Chinese or Russian soldiers. Thus, the specter of World War III is receding. But, of course, Trump has constant contradictions. If he does not send troops, he will not be able to annex Greenland, expel the Palestinians from Gaza or politically take over Panama... We must again ask ourselves whether this American withdrawal is positive in the long run, knowing that throughout history there have been just wars. If, for example, a real genocide were to occur and the United States could not be relied on - as happened in Rwanda in 1994 - such American abstention would have morally disastrous consequences. But the specter of global conflict is inevitably receding. Moreover, Trump’s unpredictability can be perceived by America’s opponents as irritating and even dangerous. To orchestrate his unpredictability is to create a kind of diplomatic fog, just as there is a fog of war. From this perspective, it is possible that this could slow down the potential military ambitions of both China and Russia. If China attacks Taiwan, what will Trump do? We do not know anything about that. But if Putin does not respect the likely upcoming ceasefire in Ukraine, there is no guarantee that Trump will not become enraged and decide to radically change his Ukrainian policy, feeling humiliated. What is certain is that in Xi Jinping’s eyes, this unpredictability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, is not good news. However, Trump is not at all unpredictable with regard to NATO and Europe, since he clearly wants the costly war in Ukraine to end and for European countries to pay for their own defense so that it no longer costs the United States anything. But he has never taken such positions on the Indo-Pacific. Why? Because Japan and South Korea are solvent and buy and invest a lot in the US! That is why China has not been very active for the time being.

### Debt---1NC

#### No debt impact.

Antonelli ’24 [Michael; February 22; financial advisor at Baird Private Wealth Management; Ross Mayfield; “All that matters: the national debt,” https://www.bairdwealth.com/insights/market-insights/baird-market-strategy/2024/02/all-that-matters-the-national-debt-or-does-it/]

Mike: So Ross, let’s tackle why the national debt even exists. The United States is a credit-based economy, which means there are assets and liabilities. And for the country to grow, assets and liabilities both need to grow.

When we issue debt, we’re issuing liabilities, but every liability is an asset for somebody else. Just two entities in our economy borrow on a large scale: the private sector and the public sector. So if you want the country’s debt to go down, you need the public sector to spend less and you need the private sector to take on more debt to keep the economy from shrinking. But do we really want the private sector, which is prone to crises, levering up so the public sector can save money?

Ross: I don’t think so. From history, we know that an over-levered private sector has led to some of the most prominent financial crises. The 2008 crisis is a perfect example of an over-levered private sector. If you gave me the choice, I’d rather the government borrow while the private sector focuses on managing their personal balance sheets.

Mike: The next question is, Is our nation bankrupt? In a blog post called I wrote about what our nation’s assets and liabilities are. Let’s say the national debt is $33 trillion and we have $400 trillion in social security and unfunded Medicare and all these other programs. That number seems crazy, doesn’t it? But let’s remember that if we have debt, we also have assets. Our assets include land, national resources in the ground and above the ground, and we also have the United States government, which has the ability to tax the most productive private sector in the history of the world. And that private sector pays their taxes in dollars. So how much is it worth to be able to tax our economy into perpetuity?

Ross: It’s almost unquantifiable in a positive way. Because as you mentioned, the government can tax in the same currency that it pays interest with. The United States has the most productive economy in the world, the biggest stock market in the world, and some of the biggest and most productive private companies in the world. The U.S. government has the ability to tax each of those sectors. Whenever these debt headlines come up, I think of “denominator blindness,” a term Barry Ritholtz coined. You can’t just think about X amount of debt, you have to compare it to something. For consumers, you compare debt to income. The national debt is the same way, and the assets of the United States are borderline unquantifiable.

Mike: We’re not trying to say that the national debt is no big deal. But instead of focusing on the total amount of debt, we care about 1) how fast the national debt is growing and 2) how we’re servicing that debt. Remember how the debt-to-GDP ratio fell to about 50% after World War II? It’s not that we paid down the debt, it’s that our economy (the GDP) outgrew those levels of debt. And while today we’re at high levels of debt, if the economy continues to grow, we can also outgrow those levels of debt. It may take a long time, but it is possible.

Ross: And we can service the debt. Interest costs are going up, but they’re still well below the amount we bring in on tax revenue. Just by that number alone, more comes in than goes out to service national debt. Both political parties have ideas about how they want to manage the national debt, and at different times throughout history there have been ratings downgrades or bond market sell-offs that keep the national debt in focus. There are things that can be done to manage the pace that the national debt grows and how easy it is to pay interest on. But from an investor perspective, is the national debt inhibiting any of the things that matter? Over the course of history, it’s never been something that investors have needed to worry about. And if investors had worried enough to stay out of the market, they would have missed tremendous gains in economic growth and stock market performance.

Mike: Dear reader, if I could transport you to my birth year, 1973, and you knew that the national debt was going to go from $450 billion all the way up to $33 trillion, would you have invested? And what if we transported you to 1991, when Ross was born, and you knew the debt was going to go from $3 trillion up to $33 trillion—would you invest? Of you course you would, because you would know that the economy and corporate profits grew alongside the debt over that period.

As we wrap up, I want to put things into better perspective from an investor standpoint. There’s a spectrum of worries you have in your life and they’re ranked as to how likely they are to happen and how much they would affect you. It’s the same thing for your money. If I were to say there’s 500 worries that can impact your money and your ability to save, I’d put the national debt towards the bottom. When it comes to the top three worries, I’d say it’s your savings and your spending, what interest rates are doing, and how solid your plan is when it comes to things like tax planning and estate planning.

Ross: There’s a tiering approach to consider. The things that are directly in your control like saving, spending and planning are in the top tier. And then there’s a tier of external factors like interest rates and the Federal Reserve, and the earnings of the companies that you’re invested in. As part owners, we want those companies to continue to grow. And we should ask ourselves if these companies care about the national debt. For these large tech companies who are investing in AI and the next wave of consumer products. do they talk about the national debt?in their C-suite meetings? The broad answer is no. And so the people who invest in those companies should probably follow suit, focusing more on interest rates, inflation, earnings and so on.

### Disease---1NC

#### The CDC structurally can’t solve. COVID proves.

Redfield ’25 [Robert and Robert Moffit; May; Senior Visiting Fellow, Center for Health and Welfare Policy; Senior Research Fellow, DeVos Center for Human Flourishing; The Heritage Foundation, “It’s Time To Fix the CDC,” https://www.heritage.org/health-care-reform/commentary/its-time-fix-the-cdc]

75 years of preparation for an outbreak like that of COVID-19—and yet, the CDC still failed to “reliably meet expectations” in addressing the crisis. That’s according to an August 2022 admission from Dr. Rochelle Walensky, President Biden’s Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

This admission was stunning, but it was also unavoidable. The agency needs work.

As Walensky conceded, it failed to provide the public and public health authorities with clear and consistent messaging, and it failed to coordinate effectively with other public health agencies. It also failed at collecting and disseminating relevant data in real time to state public health authorities and the public more broadly.

Worse, its school closure guidance and COVID-19 vaccine recommendations (especially for children) were both politicized and incompatible with emerging data and risk/benefit analyses.

Much of the agency’s failure was a direct consequence of decades of congressional inaction. Congress ignored the growing need to strengthen the agency’s public health capabilities and give it the abilities necessary to safeguard our nation’s health. Even with the onset of COVID-19, the CDC was not the agency designated to lead in communicating daily with the nation. This was a big mistake.

The CDC cannot heal itself. But, by working with Congress, the Trump administration can fix the CDC, reorganizing its structure and refocusing its mission on its primary function: to detect, control, combat and prevent communicable diseases.

This is an enormous task. Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. has outlined some initial steps toward this end, but certain additional steps will be necessary.

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First, Congress should formally authorize the CDC in statute. The House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, among others, recommended that Congress clarify the CDC’s role and responsibility as the lead federal agency in controlling infectious disease. At the same time, Congress should end bureaucratic duplication and “mission creep” by transferring certain CDC functions to other agencies within HHS that are better suited to execute them. For example, the CDC’s health promotion and disease prevention activities should be transferred to the newly created Administration for a Healthy America (AHA). Similarly, its National Center for Health Statistics could be transferred to the Agency for Health Quality Research, and its biomedical research should be transferred to the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Congress also needs to target sufficient funding to establish and maintain a real-time national public health data system—one which lawmakers should then vigilantly oversee to ensure its efficient functioning. Congress previously attempted this under my (Robert Redfield’s) tenure as CDC Director, but it invested too little to accomplish the mission. Congress and the administration must also improve and upgrade the reporting of adverse vaccine events. Today, CDC and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) jointly administer the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS). But this system is defective in that it relies on unverified patient self-reporting, making it incapable of determining a causal relationship between vaccines and specific injuries. Fixing this system is key to combating today’s dangerous vaccine hesitancy and rebuilding the public’s confidence in vaccines. But the solution requires both accurate information and rapid response. Given its long experience and institutional responsibility for determining drug safety and effectiveness, the FDA (which, unlike the CDC, is a regulatory agency) should be given sole responsibility for post-market vaccine surveillance. Congress should ensure that FDA has the necessary capacity to monitor adverse vaccine events and intervene quickly to protect the public from vaccine injuries. While some responsibilities should be reassigned from the CDC to other agencies, other tasks should be restored to it. In keeping with the CDC’s primary mission, Secretary Kennedy rightly decided to restore management of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)—the national repository for medical equipment and supplies—to the CDC. In 2018, the SNS was taken over by the Administration for Preparedness and Response, a subagency within HHS. But the Government Accountability Office (GAO) soon determined that its management of the SNS was deficient. Unfortunately, the problems with the SNS spanned both Democratic and Republican administrations. These problems, particularly insufficient inventories, contributed to the shortage of critical supplies early in the COVID-19 pandemic. Pursuant to Secretary Kennedy’s direction and effective congressional oversight, the restoration of the CDC’s management of the Strategic National Stockpile will improve the nation’s readiness to cope with the next pandemic. With the appropriate inventories of critical medical supplies, medications and equipment, we can avoid a repeat of the COVID-19 failures. Another way to improve the performance of the agency in a pandemic is by transferring the CDC headquarters from Atlanta to Washington, D.C. In a national medical emergency, the Director of the CDC should have immediate face-to-face access to the president, the HHS secretary, and other federal officials, as well as congressional leadership. Time-consuming travel, Zoom calls, or other online communications will not suffice for the kind of deliberation and debate necessary to forge complex and timely policy responses during a pandemic. The CDC is dominated by career officials, but policy development requires prudent judgment—not just managerial, technical, or scientific expertise—to calibrate a careful balance of competing public goods. Therefore, the Trump administration should increase the number of non-career or “political” appointees to assist the director in formulating, communicating, and executing agency policies. The administration should also decentralize agency operations to enable better federal-state communication and data sharing. During the pandemic, the CDC didn’t just fail to communicate effectively with state public health officials—it also frequently failed to get on-the-ground information from states and localities.

<<PARAGRAPH INTEGRITY RESUMES>>

As Professor Emeritus Donald F. Kettle at the University of Maryland observed, “In the U.S., there simply wasn’t any mechanism for collecting nationally what the states and their cities were learning, and that ~~handicapped~~ [hampered] the American response. In fact, one of the most profound American breakdowns was the failure even to recognize that this was an essential question in desperate need of a solid answer.”

#### No extinction from disease: genetic diversity, natural selection, and isolation.

Vermeer ’25 [Michael J.D., Emily Lathrop, and Alvin Moon; May 6; PhD Chemistry, senior physical scientist at RAND; PhD Mechanical Engineering, associate engineer at RAND; PhD Mathematics, associate mathematician at RAND; RAND, “On the Extinction Risk from Artificial Intelligence,” p. 18-21, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\_reports/RRA3000/RRA3034-1/RAND\_RRA3034-1.pdf]

Requirement 1. Multiple Pathogens Are Likely Required Because a Single Pathogen Would Be Unlikely to Kill a Sufficient Percentage of the Population to Be an Extinction Threat

To support this assertion, we look first to historical pandemics. Natural biological threats have existed for millennia. The 14th-century bubonic plague—the Black Death—wiped out 30–50 percent of Europe’s population, and the 1918 influenza pandemic resulted in 50 million deaths worldwide (Shipman, 2014). The combination of drought and pathogens introduced during the European conquest of Mexico in the 16th century led to more than a 90-percent reduction in the native population (Acuna-Soto et al., 2002). However, although these examples led to drastic human population declines, they did not fully extinguish the human population. Indeed, with one known exception—the extinction of the Christmas Island rat, preceded by the emergence of a deadly pathogen in the population—there are no well-corroborated instances of pathogens causing the complete extinction of a mammalian species (Wyatt et al., 2008).

A greater threat would likely come from novel pathogens, including both modified natural pathogens or completely de novo pathogens, designed for high transmissibility and high lethality. However, even pathogens designed to cause these effects might be limited by human heterogeneity. Human genetic diversity plays a key role in limiting the effectiveness of pathogens across populations. Within a population, pathogens affect individuals differently depending on factors related to the specific genetic characteristics of each host (Jones, 2021). Some individuals or subpopulations might possess genetic traits that confer resistance or immunity to certain pathogens. For example, differences in viral receptors between individuals can affect the ability of the hepatitis C virus to enter a host’s cells (Huang et al., 2019).

The strength of immune response can vary among individuals, influencing their ability to fight off infections. The likelihood that a pathogen will cause death is influenced by the immune response that an individual is able to put up against the pathogen (Rouse and Sehrawat, 2010), meaning that outcomes will vary between individuals, even when controlling for pathogen dose.

Relatedly, the infection dose—the amount of a pathogen that an individual is exposed to—can significantly alter the course of a disease (Rouse and Sehrawat, 2010). Individuals who only receive a small infection dose have a higher chance of successfully mounting an immune response, and infection dose is a factor that cannot easily be controlled for. This is the case not only for transmissible pathogens that spread person-to-person but also for nontransmissible pathogens, such as Bacillus anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax. As a result, it is unlikely that even a carefully engineered pathogen would be 100 percent lethal for all humans, as certain individuals or populations might possess traits that allow them to fight the disease or receive a nonlethal dose of the pathogen that causes the disease. Case studies have suggested that exposure to even highly lethal viruses, such as rabies, is not always fatal (Gold et al., 2020).

The postinfection survival of some individuals leads to several important consequences. First, some populations will emerge with immunity; survivors might develop immunological memory, thereby reducing the severity of disease on reinfection. Second, over generations, natural selection will dictate that hosts with immune systems that are better equipped to fight off a pathogen will survive and pass along those traits to offspring. Third, subpopulations with increased immunity within a larger population can alter disease dynamics, thereby lowering the pool of susceptible individuals and reducing the continued spread of a pathogen in the population (Grassly and Fraser, 2008).

Finally, even if a single pathogen could be designed to be consistently highly lethal after many replications, we assert that sufficient numbers of humans would likely survive to avoid extinction. A virus that was 99.99 percent lethal and reached the entire human population, for example, might leave at least 800,000 individuals alive. As previously noted, the minimum viable population for human beings is unknown, but it is likely well below 800,000 people.

Requirement 2. Widespread Dissemination in Multiple Places Is Likely Required Because Initial Infections of a Small Population in One Location Could Allow a Pathogen to Mutate to Become Less Lethal over Time

For transmissible pathogens, evolutionary pressures and host-pathogen interactions result in altered pathogen characteristics as the pathogen reproduces within a host and spreads host to host (Geoghegan and Holmes, 2018; Gerstein, Espinosa, and Leidy, 2024). This results in modifications to pathogen characteristics, leading to variants with modified lethality and transmissibility. In addition to host-pathogen interactions altering pathogen characteristics, viruses are prone to transcription and translation errors, resulting in random mutations over time and unpredictable changes in pathogen characteristics (Sanjuán et al., 2010).

In one well-cited evolutionary biology study, researchers traced the evolution of the myxoma virus, which was introduced to Australia in 1950 to control the invasive rabbit population (Kerr et al., 2012). The original virus was highly lethal with a 99.8 percent fatality rate. However, once released, the virus quickly mutated, and, within two years, the landscape was dominated by less lethal strains, even with the continued release of very virulent strains into the local population (Kerr et al., 2012). Although these less lethal strains still had fatality rates of between 70 percent and 95 percent, this allowed for the survival of some rabbits; this natural selection resulted in the emergence of rabbit resistance to myxomatosis (Marshall and Douglas, 1961). Ultimately, the virus failed to exterminate the invasive rabbit population, and invasive rabbits persist in Australia as of this writing. Interestingly, this experiment was independently repeated in France in 1952 with similar results: the emergence of attenuated (i.e., less virulent) strains and natural selection for resistant rabbits (Kerr et al., 2012). We note, however, that the different generational periods for humans and rabbits might indicate the need for caution in applying this example to an equivalent scenario affecting humans. Rabbits reach reproductive age on much shorter timescales than humans do and have many more offspring per pregnancy. Therefore, it might be much more challenging for a human population to recover and sustain itself in the face of a similarly lethal transmissible virus.

Both theory and historical examples of virus evolution indicate that highly lethal viruses will often evolve to decreased virulence over time, resulting in lower mortality (Geoghegan and Holmes, 2018). This makes intuitive sense because very lethal pathogens will quickly sicken and kill their hosts, thereby limiting their own transmission opportunities. Conversely, less virulent strains that allow hosts to survive longer have more chances of spreading among a population, leading to increased presence in a population. If a pathogen retains alternative nonhuman hosts—a reservoir species—it might be less self-limiting because the pathogen could conceivably maintain high lethality in human hosts concurrently with transmissibility from the reservoir species. Others have found, however, that low-virulence infections have a greater chance of establishing transmission in human hosts, which might diminish the ability of pathogens to completely wipe out a human population, even where a reservoir species exists (Geoghegan and Holmes, 2018; Geoghegan et al., 2016).

Requirement 3. Follow-Up Actions Are Likely Required After an Initial Dissemination of a Pathogen Because Natural and Artificial Isolation Might Shield Human Communities from Infection

The path of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic illustrates that a highly transmissible pathogen can readily infect every region of the world despite efforts to contain it (e.g., lockdowns) (Onyeaka et al., 2021; Jeanne et al., 2023); it was a pandemic with truly global diffusion. Although the relatively low lethality of COVID-19—relative to the extremely high lethality assumed in our scenario—and the prevalence of asymptomatic cases likely aided in the diffusion of the virus, the pandemic showed that a pathogen could realistically have global diffusion. However, global diffusion is not sufficient for a pathogen to create an extinction risk—it must reach nearly every human community on earth, even those that are naturally or artificially isolated.

There still exist uncontacted tribes, and many regions and communities remain relatively isolated. As a highly lethal pandemic spreads, it is likely that human communities would take steps to isolate themselves to whatever extent they could to prevent infection; island nations have even been suggested as potential refuges from pandemics with extinction potential (Boyd and Wilson, 2020; Turchin and Green, 2019). Where human communities are successful in isolating themselves from contact with the pathogen, follow-up actions would be required to either intentionally disseminate the pathogen among them or to find other means to exterminate surviving humans.

### Trade---1NC

#### No trade impact.

Clare ’22 [Stephen; February 15; Research Fellow at the Forethought Foundation for Global Priorities Research, B.A., McMaster University, Sustainability Studies, M.A., McGill University, Natural Resources Management and Policy; Effective Altruism Forum, “How likely is World War III?” https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/aSzxoj7irC5jNHceB/how-likely-is-world-war-iii]

You can’t trade with someone you’re at war with. So, the more two countries trade, the more costly a war between them will be, and the less likely they should be to fight. This argument is appealing for a few reasons. First, it makes intuitive sense. Second, it looks like it fits the data well, at least for the post-war period. Since WWII, international trade has grown dramatically while the rate of international conflict has fallen.

This theory also benefits from some seemingly-strong empirical support. Two prominent proponents, Bruce Russett and John Oneal, have produced a number of books and papers that show increased economic interdependence, usually measured as the value of bilateral trade between two countries divided by a country’s GDP, reduces the chance of war between two countries. More specifically, in a 2003 paper they report that “increasing economic interdependence from the 10th to the 90th percentile reduces the risk of a fatal dispute by 32 percent.”[17] At that time, the volume of US-China trade was just below the 90th percentile for their data, and the authors conclude that the growth of US-China trade reduced the chance of conflict by 27%.[18]

That said, while a 27% reduction in the chance of war is nice, it’s not a big enough effect to fully explain the Long Peace. Other reasons to think that the pacifying effect of global trade is smaller than is sometimes claimed include:

1. The economic benefits of trade with any one country are usually not that large.[19] [FN 19] In 2003, the US-China trade as a proportion of the US economy was around the 90th percentile for trade interdependence, but was just 1.2% of US GDP (“Causes of Peace”, p. 383) [END FN 19]

2. Long-term gains from success in war can be larger than temporary disruptions in trade.[20] [FN 20] “A dispute normally affects trade for only one or two years” (“Causes of Peace”, pp. 388-9), so the costs are typically bounded. But the benefits of conquering territory, stymying the rise of rivals, or gaining influence over international rules and institutions could flow for a long time. [END FN 20]

3. As the world gets more interconnected, trade with any given country A will become a smaller proportion of a country B’s economy.

4. Some scholars have noted that negotiating trade deals also gives one country more leverage over the other, and potentially raises more issues over which countries can disagree.[21] [FN 21] For example, Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas has been a source of tension between European countries, and between countries like Russia and France. [END FN 21]

5. Global trade was at historic highs just prior to WWI

Finally, disentangling the causal relationships among the highly-correlated variables of trade interdependence, GDP level, strength of democracy, and participation in international organizations is difficult. Russett, Oneal, and collaborators try things like measuring lagged effects to try and improve their causal inference, but I’m not sure how successfully this isolates causal relationships. I think these studies provide strong evidence of the direction of the effect, but my best guess would be that they overestimate its size.[22] [FN 22] To quantify: I think there’s an 80% chance that doubling the amount of trade between two countries reduces the annual chance they go to war by between 0% and 35%. [END FN 22]

#### Growth is unsustainable and causes extinction---the impossibility of decoupling within available timescales necessitates degrowth.

Fletcher ’24 [Charles, William Ripple, Thomas Newsome, Phoebe Barnard, Kamanamaikalani Beamer, Aishwarya Behl, Jay Bowen, Michael Cooney, Eileen Crist, Christopher Field, Krista Hiser, David Karl, David King, Michael Mann, Davianna McGregor, Camilo Mora, Naomi Oreskes, and Michael Wilson; April 2024; Interim Dean of the School of Ocean and Earth Science and Technology at the University of Hawaii; Professor of Ecology at Oregon State University, Ph.D. in Ecology from Oregon State University; Associate Professor in the Department of Forest Ecosystems at the University of Sydney; Professor of Conservation Biology and Environmental Futures at the University of Washington, Ph.D. in Environmental Sciences from the University of Witwaterstraand; Dana Naone Hall Chair in the Center for Hawaiian Studies at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa; Student in Journalism and Earth Science at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa; Ph.D. in Chemical Engineering and Research Associate at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa; Associate Professor in the Department of Science, Technology, and Society at Virginia Tech; Ph.D. in Biological Sciences from Stanford University; Sustainability Coordinator for the University of Hawai’i Office of Sustainability; Victor and Peggy Brandstrom Pavel Professor of Microbial Oceanography at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, Ph.D. in Oceanography from the University of California San Diego; Head of the Climate Crisis Advisory Group, Ph.D. in Chemistry from the University of Witwaterstraand; Presidential Distinguishable Professor of Earth and Environmental Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D. in Geology and Geophysics from Yale University; Professor Emerita in Ethnic Studies at the University of Hawaii, Manoa; Professor of Data Analytics at the University of Hawaii at Manoa; Professor of the History of Science and Affiliated Professor of Earth and Planetary Sciences at Harvard University, Ph.D. in Geological Research and History of Science from Stanford University; Professor of Ecology, Evolution, and Behavior at the University of Minnesota; PNAS Nexus, “Earth at Risk: An Urgent Call to End the Age of Destruction and Forge a Just and Sustainable Future,” https://academic.oup.com/pnasnexus/article/3/4/pgae106/7638480]

It is unequivocal that human influence has warmed the atmosphere (1) and the climate crisis is now well underway. Global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions set a new record in 2023 (2), rising an estimated 1.1%, the third annual increase in a row since the COVID-19 recession. With a record 1.45 ± 0.12°C of anthropogenic global heating reached in 2023 (3), we already see nearly one-third of the world population exposed to deadly heat waves (4), a 9-fold increase in large North American wildfires (5), record-setting regional-scale megadrought (6), the Antarctic ice sheet losing nearly 75% more ice between 2011 and 2020 than it did for the period 2001 and 2010 (7), animal and plant extinctions projected to increase 2- to 5-fold in coming decades (8), deepening genetic diversity loss (9), and a weakened global ecosystem (10) pushed to its breaking point (11).

Scientists suspect the last several years have been warmer than any point in more than 125,000 years (12). Yet demand for oil climbed to over 100 million barrels per day in 2023, the highest in history (13). Despite decades of global investment in clean energy (14), fossil fuels still provide over 80% of global energy use (15), a figure that has not changed for decades. In the absence of climate action, our world is on course (16) to heat a blistering 3°C, perhaps more (17), potentially displacing one-third of humanity (18).

One study (19) suggests that ∼9% of people (>600 million) already live outside the human climate “niche.” Another concludes that, compared with people born in 1960, children born today will experience 7.5 times as many heatwaves, 3.6 times as many droughts, 3 times as many crop failures, 2.8 times as many river floods, and 2 times as many wildfires (20). Studies (21) forecast climate-related extinction of 14–32% of macroscopic species in the next ∼50 years, including 3–6 million animal and plant species, even under intermediate climate change scenarios. With continued warming, the frequency of wildfires will increase over 74% of the global landmass by the end of this century (22). Such assessments are conservative as they are based on projections from climate models that may not capture some important processes through which human-caused heating amplifies persistent weather extremes (23, 24).

Of the 40 leading economies, all of which agreed in the 2015 Paris Climate Accord to take all necessary actions to stop global heating below 1.5°C, not one nation is on track to do what they promised (25). Globally, current climate policies are incompatible with limiting global heating to 1.5°C (26). The remaining budget for a 50% chance of keeping warming to 1.5°C is approximately 250 GtCO2 as of January 2023, now equal to around 6 years of current emissions (27). The energy plans of countries responsible for the largest GHG emissions would lead to 460% more coal production, 83% more natural gas, and 29% more oil in 2030 than is compatible with limiting global heating to 1.5°C, and 69% more fossil fuels than is compatible with the riskier 2°C target (28).

The market cost of oil, coal, and natural gas is distorted by subsidies and does not include negative externalities related to pollution, climate change, healthcare, and others (29). Worse, the false promise (30) and widespread allure of unregulated quick fixes, such as “net-zero” contracts that lack monitoring, auditing, and verification, threaten to derail even the best-intentioned commercial and governmental plans for climate stabilization (31). Investigations suggest that the great majority of products transacted on carbon offset markets remove very little GHG from the atmosphere (32), and models indicate that even direct removal of atmospheric CO2 does not recover former environmental conditions crucial to food and water security or ecosystem restoration (33).

<<TEXT CONDENSED, NONE OMITTED>>

We do not promote a “doom and gloom” philosophy regarding the future of human civilization. We are optimistic that humanity can correct the unsustainable pathway that we are on. Later in this review, we describe necessary steps in this direction. However, we do take an objective and realistic stand on the issue of sustainability. The realities described here quantify a severe and immediate threat to human health and well-being. They emphasize the imperative for a rapid, sweeping reduction in GHG emissions, and highlight stubborn barriers that impede progress. Developed nations, emerging economies, and commercial entities must invest in rapid decarbonization; correct market distortions favoring fossil fuels; and avoid the spurious trap of false “net-zero” offsets as an excuse to continue polluting the atmosphere. Imperialism, overpopulation, and resource extraction Around the world, a growing number of entities and environmental activists are taking action (34). As of December 2022, there have been 2,180 climate-related legal cases filed in 65 jurisdictions, including international and regional courts, tribunals, quasijudicial bodies, or other adjudicatory bodies. Lawsuits related to climate change have more than doubled over the last 5 years as litigants see courts as a way to enhance (or delay) climate action (35). Children and youth, women's groups, local communities, and Indigenous Peoples, among others, are taking a prominent role in bringing these cases and driving climate change governance reform around the world. This “climate justice movement” seeks to extend the principles of human rights and environmental justice by arguing that future generations have a birthright to a safe climate capable of sustaining genuine human development on a healthy and resilient planet (36). Yet, for hundreds of years, various manifestations of imperialism, such as slavery, settler colonization, economic and cultural dominance, neocolonialism (37), and the forces of globalization, have promoted a mindset of class privilege and wealth. Motivated by profit, the mechanisms of industrial capitalism have pursued relentless resource depletion achieved by subjugation of local communities, erasure of Indigenous knowledge, and unsustainable plunder of the natural world (38).

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Modern imperialism is embodied by industrial capitalism, which prioritizes resource extraction and maximizing profit. This paradigm is deeply embedded in the fabric of global affairs, influencing international trade, political dynamics, and the economic frameworks of nations (39). The persistent reliance on extractive economic practices continues to be a significant obstacle to making critical progress in decarbonization, conserving natural resources, and ensuring social equity. For instance, despite decades of international commitments to end deforestation, around 4.1 M hectares of primary tropical rainforest was lost globally in 2022—an increase of 10% over 2021—producing 2.7 Gt of CO2 emissions, equivalent to the annual fossil fuel emissions of India (40). Most modern socioeconomic systems still follow extractive rules of exploitation and trade, and ignore natural rates of resource renewal, failing to consider that the end result is catastrophic (41).

Global population growth amplifies the damage wrought by industrial capitalism. On 15 November 2022, the world's population reached 8 billion people. Human population is expected to increase by nearly 2 billion in the next 30 years, and could peak at nearly 10.4 billion in the mid-2080s (42). Cambridge economist Sir Partha Dasgupta developed a rigorous approach to the question “What is optimal human population?” (43). His theory relates population, consumption, and resource capacity, concluding that an optimal global population lies between 0.5 and 5 billion. This theory implies that Earth is already overpopulated relative to ecological carrying capacity. With every additional person added to the planet, wild habitats are disturbed or destroyed by urbanism, agricultural activities, and resource consumption, with humanity demanding more than what the biosphere can sustainably provide.

Dasgupta highlights the critical connection between our economies, livelihoods, and well-being with the Earth’s resources. He argues that current global demand for natural resources surpasses its capacity to supply, driven by factors like population growth and consumption patterns. This overuse threatens biodiversity and ecosystem services. To safeguard our prosperity and the environment, we must rethink our approach to economic success. Key recommendations include increasing nature's capacity and ensuring our demands on nature stay within sustainable limits. This involves investing in natural capital, revising economic metrics, transforming institutions (especially finance and education), and empowering citizens. Legitimate sustainability is vital for achieving a long-term balance between population, economic growth, and the environment. Future generations’ well-being hinges on how we manage economic, social, and natural resources today. Urgent action is required to address these interconnected challenges.

Given the current state of the ecosphere, a 25% increase in population and projected doubling of economic activity by 2050 (44) may drive major ecological regime shifts (i.e. forest to savannah, savannah to desert, thawing tundra, and others) well before 2080. Nature may impose its own population correction before standard projections are realized (45). Actions to slow and reverse population growth are critical (46). These include empowering women, investing in girls’ education, strengthening healthcare systems, and implementing social welfare programs that create job opportunities, reduce poverty, and improve living standards.

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Human population growth, increased economic demands, rising heat, and extreme weather events put pressures on ecosystems and landscapes to supply food and maintain services such as clean water. Studies show that ecosystems threatened by sudden regime shifts are at greater risk of collapse than previously thought (47). Researchers warn that more than a fifth of ecosystems worldwide, including the Amazon rainforest, are at risk of a catastrophic breakdown within a human lifetime. The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a suite of 17 objectives with 169 targets established in 2015 for achievement by 2030, face a grim forecast: current trends suggest none of the goals and merely 12% of the targets may be realized (48). This shortfall underscores the urgent need to dismantle the entrenched model of resource extraction and wealth concentration, advocating for a paradigm shift toward genuine sustainability and resource regeneration. Such a transformation is imperative to reverse the tide of biodiversity loss due to overconsumption and to reinstate the security of food and water supplies, which are foundational for the survival of global populations. Global economics and values Convergence of worldwide trends threatens safe and sustainable human development: accelerating impacts from climate change (49), biodiversity loss (50) caused by unsustainable consumption (51), extractive agriculture, natural resource exploitation (52) and limitations, emergent disease (53), pervasive pollution (54), and socioeconomic injustice (55). To secure a safe future for humanity, global economics and values must protect the well-being of the natural world. This requires understanding the impacts, intersections and feedbacks of these global emergencies, as well as solutions to ensure a livable planet (56). These emergencies, promulgated by extractive policies (57), human population growth, and modern imperialism (58), overlap in ways that amplify negative outcomes (Fig. 1). If successive governments treat these issues in isolation, hesitate, or formulate shallow responses, the fallout may be catastrophic. Without immediate action, we risk entering a malignant era of global distress and suffering characterized by disease, thirst and hunger, impoverishment, and political instability. The cocoon of wealth enjoyed by developed nations belies the suffering and misery many low latitude and semiarid communities already endure in tenuous heat and drought conditions. Consider the Northern Hemisphere summer of 2023. Over 80% of the global population experienced climate change-driven heat in the month of July (59) (Fig. 2). It featured 7 consecutive months of record-shattering global temperature driven by a combination of a moderately strong El Niño and a decrease of Earth's albedo (equivalent to an increase of atmospheric CO2 from 420 to 530 ppm) (60). Extreme heatwaves swept many parts of the world. Sea surface temperatures leapt to record highs. Antarctic sea ice was far below average. Record wildfires burned for months destroying tens of millions of acres and produced continental-scale public health crises in air quality, and tens of thousands of temperature records around the world were broken. Without human-induced climate change these events would have been extremely rare (61). It is past time to build a new era of reciprocity with nature that redefines natural resource economics. The ecological contributions of Indigenous Peoples through their governance institutions and practices are gaining recognition and interest. Indigenous systems of land management encompass a holistic approach that values sacred, ethical, and reciprocal relationships with nature, integrating traditional knowledge and stewardship principles to sustainably manage land and water resources. Indigenous land management challenges conventional power structures and introduces innovative solutions to environmental issues, especially in the context of climate change. Indigenous Peoples exercise traditional rights over a quarter of Earth's surface, overlapping with a third of intact forests and intersecting about 40% of all terrestrial protected areas and ecologically intact landscapes. These lands typically have reduced deforestation, degradation, and carbon emissions, compared with nonprotected areas and protected areas (62). Beyond western ideas of quarantining land for conservation, Indigenous land management involves a mix of active land management, biomimicry, and conservation to maximize nutrition, food and water security, carbon sequestration, biodiversity, and ecosystem restoration (63). These qualities offer beneficial feedbacks that increase human health and resiliency, build social equity, and provide for the needs of future generations. We suggest that an Indigenous worldview, that of kinship with nature, should define sustainable practices. Laws that establish legal rights for nature have reached a critical point at which they may either be normalized or marginalized (64); this progress must be sustained. For instance, Māori in New Zealand have successfully asserted sovereignty to grant legal personhood to the Whanganui River and Te Urewera National Park. This reflects Māori worldviews and recognizes their governance, allowing “nature” to have a legal voice. In the US, the Menominee Forest Management Reserve, recognized as a best practice, is driven by the Menominee vision and worldviews. It operates under the recognition of Menominee sovereignty and decision-making authority. Nations must build on these regenerative practices by eliminating environmentally harmful subsidies (65), and restricting trade that generates pollution and unsustainable consumption. Studies (66) indicate the global economy must achieve absolute decoupling (in which resource impacts decline in absolute terms) (67) if we are to eliminate “ecological overshoot”(68). In the words of coauthor Jay Bowen, Upper Skagit Elder, “We are all Indigenous to this Earth. We are one family.” The authors of this review believe that humanity stands at an inflection point in human history that will determine many characteristics of future life on Earth (Fig. 3). Continued failure to integrate these problems in climate resilient development and regenerative practices risks the stability of human communities and natural systems. Heads of state must recognize the existence of a global emergency (56), treat these crises as intertwined issues, and apply the considerable power of the economy toward restoring a livable planet and an equitable and just socioeconomic system before climate instability and ecological regime shift are beyond our control. Later in this paper, we offer specific suggestions for implementing these changes. The stability of human communities and natural ecosystems is at risk under the shocks and stresses of five planetary emergencies: socioeconomic inequality, climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution, and disease. Unless human values shift dramatically and soon, the resulting damage to the natural world will likely be catastrophic, with long-lasting consequences for species and ecosystems, and devastating upheavals for humanity. A systemic change in human values is needed that focuses on Earth-centered governance, and entails a transition in collective values, behaviors, and institutional practices to prioritize long-term ecological health and social well-being over immediate gains. Fig. 3.The stability of human communities and natural ecosystems is at risk under the shocks and stresses of five planetary emergencies: socioeconomic inequality, climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution, and disease. Unless human values shift dramatically and soon, the resulting damage to the natural world will likely be catastrophic, with long-lasting consequences for species and ecosystems, and devastating upheavals for humanity. A systemic change in human values is needed that focuses on Earth-centered governance, and entails a transition in collective values, behaviors, and institutional practices to prioritize long-term ecological health and social well-being over immediate gains. In April 2023, CO2 levels measured at Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawai‘i reached an annual peak of 424.8 ppm, more than 50% greater than the preindustrial level of 278 ppm. In the first decade of measurement at Mauna Loa (1959–1968), the average annual growth rate was 0.8 ppm per year. The average annual growth rate over the most recent decade (2014–2023) was 3 times that amount, 2.4 ppm per year, the fastest sustained rate of increase in 65 years of monitoring (69). More than half of all industrial CO2 emissions have occurred since 1988 and 40% of the CO2 we emit today will still be in the atmosphere in 100 years, about 20% will still be there in about 1,000 years (70). The last time CO2 levels were this high was the Pliocene Climatic Optimum, 4.4 milion years ago, when Earth's climate was radically different; global temperature was 2–3°C hotter, beech trees grew near the South Pole, there was no Greenland ice sheet, no West Antarctic ice sheet, and global sea level was as much as 25 m higher than today (71). Atmospheric methane (CH4) growth has surged since 2020. Averaged over 2 decades, the global heating potential of CH4 is 80 times greater than CO2. The largest sources of atmospheric CH4 are wetlands, freshwater areas, agriculture, fossil fuel extraction, landfills, and fires. In 2023, atmospheric CH4 exceeded 1,919 ppb, on track to triple the preindustrial level of 700 ppb by 2030. Carbon isotopic signatures reveal microbial decomposition of organic matter as the major source of CH4 emissions, indicating that natural CH4-producing processes are being amplified by climate change itself (72). Is this a sign that global heating is shifting beyond our control? Under an intermediate scenario (SSP2-4.5), GHG emissions are very likely to lead to heating of 1.2–1.8°C in the near term (2021–2040), 1.6–2.5°C in the midterm (2041–2060), and 2.1–3.5°C in the long term (2081–2100) (73). As of November 2023, 145 countries had announced or are considering net-zero targets, covering close to 90% of global emissions (74). Among these are China, EU, USA, and India, who jointly represent more than half of global GHG emissions. However, net-zero evaluations for G20 countries and selected other countries as of November 2023 show that most net-zero targets are formulated vaguely and do not yet conform with good practices. Even as the vast majority of countries pledged to slash their climate emissions, their own plans and projections put them on track to extract more than twice the level of fossil fuels by 2030 than would be consistent with limiting heating to 1.5°C, and nearly 70% more than would be consistent with 2°C of heating (28). The world has a 67% chance of limiting warming to 2.9°C if countries stick to the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) made under the 2015 Paris agreement (26). Emission cuts of 14 GtCO2 or 28% are needed by 2030 to keep within 2°C of warming. A reduction of more than 40% or 22 GtCO2 is needed for the 1.5°C threshold to be realistic. The world now only has a 14% chance of limiting warming to the 1.5°C goal, even if countries honor all NDCs. Limiting warming to 1.5°C would require global emission reduction of 8.7% per year. Even with COVID-19 lockdowns limiting manufacturing, ground and air transportation, and other economic activities during 2020, emissions dropped by only 4.7% (26). Many countries’ net-zero pledges “are not currently considered credible” (26). No G20 country is reducing emissions at a pace consistent with their net-zero targets. The lifetime emissions of current and planned oil and gas fields and coal mines is 3 and a half times greater than the carbon budget needed to hold temperature increase to 1.5°C. It would exhaust almost all the budget needed for 2°C. Under current national climate plans, emissions are expected to rise 9% above 2010 levels by the end of this decade even if NDCs are fully implemented. GHG emissions would fall to 2% below 2019 levels by 2030. Although these numbers suggest the world will see emissions peak this decade, that's still far short of the 43% reduction against 2019 levels that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) says is needed to stay within the 1.5°C target envisioned by the Paris Agreement (26). Emission reductions of 43% are needed by 2030 to keep 1.5°C in play. But since the 26th Conference of Parties (COP) in 2021, nations have shaved just 1% off their projected emissions for 2030, and COP 28 in 2023 ended with no increase in ambition. Seventy-five percent of nations that have set targets to limit GHG emissions have enshrined them in law or policy documents, but the plans needed to implement those pledges are lacking in almost all cases (74), and policies based on “net-zero” actions no longer have credibility. Current pledges would lead to long-term global heating of 2.4–2.6°C, but on-the-ground policies put the world on track for heating approximately 3°C above preindustrial levels. Avoiding dangerous levels of heating requires systemic transformation to energy, waste, transportation, agriculture, and industry. Climate indicators show that global heating reached 1.14°C averaged over the past decade, 1.26°C in 2022, and 1.45 ± 0.12°C over the 12-month period of 2023. In 2023, some 7.3 billion people worldwide were exposed, for at least 10 days, to temperatures influenced by global warming, with one-quarter of people facing dangerous levels of extreme heat. Heating is increasing at an unprecedented rate of over 0.2°C per decade (perhaps faster) caused by a combination of annual GHG emissions at an all-time high of 54 ± 5.3 GtCO2e over the last decade, and reductions in the strength of aerosol cooling (17). The Northern Hemisphere summer of 2023 revealed a shift in climate indicators marking a new level of intensity. “There has never been a summer like this in recorded history: shocking ocean heat, deadly land heat, unprecedented fires and smoke, sea ice melting faster than we’ve ever seen or thought possible (75).” Climate outlook

<<PARAGRAPH BREAKS RESUME>>

Planned cuts in global emissions are inadequate for protecting human security and Earth's remaining biodiversity. Under implemented national policies alone, dangerous heating is only avoidable with a massive rollout of GHG removal technologies and large-scale ecosystem restoration that is nowhere in evidence today. For instance, even the planned investment of $3.5B to develop four “direct air capture” hubs under the 2022 US Bipartisan Infrastructure Law will only remove the equivalent of 13 min of global emissions at full annual capacity (30). Planting 8 billion trees, one for every person on Earth, would remove the equivalent of only 43 h of global emissions after the trees reached maturity decades from now, and the change in albedo related to the new ground cover increases the complexity of expected benefits.

The only honest strategy for today is radical, immediate cuts in fossil fuel use. Only after emissions have begun a rapid downward trajectory should investments in carbon removal (the engineering for which has yet to be defined or validated) occur with speed and at scale (76). Even this will be met with ocean outgassing of CO2 such that climate recovery will see a long delay (33).

This urgency is underscored by the fact that current emissions are underreported, and decreasing natural carbon storage makes limiting global temperatures even more challenging. Global emissions are as much as 3 times higher than reported (77) with 70% underreporting of energy-related CH4 emissions alone (78). In addition, the terrestrial biome, which sequesters about 31% of anthropogenic CO2 emissions, has already neared, and in places crossed, a photosynthetic thermal maximum beyond which terrestrial carbon storage will grow increasingly impossible (79). For instance, global carbon loss from tropical forests has doubled in the last 20 years (80), and the Brazilian portion of the Amazon Forest has become a net GHG source (81). Eighty-three percent of tropical forest carbon loss is driven by agriculture, suggesting that strategies to reduce deforestation have failed, and that carbon emissions from forest destruction are undercounted (82).

The United Nations estimates that 1.84 billion people worldwide, or nearly a quarter of humanity, were living under drought in 2022 and 2023, the vast majority in low- and middle-income countries (83). Megadrought projected for the year 2100 could strike up to 50 years earlier according to models (84). Global heating risks food (85) and water (86) availability with human populations in conditions of extreme to exceptional drought (87) doubling by 2100 (88).

Climate change threatens natural ecosystems (89), human security (90), livable conditions for communities (91), and the stability of 1/3 of the human population (18). Under current levels of heating, people are 15 times more likely to die from extreme weather than in years past, and 3.3 billion human lives are “highly vulnerable” to climate change (92). At 2°C heating, up to 3 billion people may suffer chronic water scarcity. Today, 1 in 3 people are exposed to deadly heat stress. This number is projected to increase up to 75% by the end of the century.

By 2050, over 300 million people living on coasts will be exposed to flooding from sea level rise (93). Forced to migrate, the impacts of these displaced communities will ripple through the larger population. Climate change drives the spread of disease in people, crops, domesticated animals, and wildlife. Even if heating is held below 1.6°C, 8% of today's farmland will be unfit to produce food. Declining food production and nutrient losses will result in severe stunting affecting 1 million children in Africa alone and cause 183 million additional people to go hungry by 2050 (92).

Abrupt change

Earth's biophysical systems are shifting toward instability (94), perhaps irreversibly (95). The IPCC has identified 15 Earth system components with potential for abrupt destabilizing change, including ice, ocean, and air circulation; large ecosystems; and precipitation. These systems are the pillars of life that permit stable plant, animal, and microbial communities, food production, clean water and establish the conditions for safe human development. However, these systems may be characterized by threshold behavior. That is, they appear to remain stable as global temperature rises, but at a certain level of heating, they may “tip” into a fundamentally irreversible new state (96).

As Earth retains heat, ice melt accelerates (97), especially in the Arctic which is heating nearly 4 times faster than the global average (98). Arctic sea ice is declining (99), and the transition from a snow- to rain-dominated Arctic in the summer and autumn may occur as early as 2040, with profound climatic, ecosystem, and socioeconomic impacts (100). The Greenland Ice Sheet is vulnerable to ice loss due to melt-elevation feedback (101), and Greenland is losing ice 7 times faster than in the 1990s (102). Antarctic melting has tripled in the past 5 years (103), and ice shelf collapse may lead to amplified sea level rise (104, 105).

According to one study, if temperatures rise by 1.5°C, the loss of four biophysical systems will become “likely” and loss of an additional six will be “possible.” Loss of 13 biophysical systems will be either “likely” or “possible” if the planet warms by 2.6°C, as expected under current climate policies (94). Emerging changes such as deep ocean heating (106), marine stratification (107), declining marine vertical circulation (108), and sea level rise (109) will continue for centuries even if net-zero emission targets are reached. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Assessment Report 6, Working Group I (110) projects possibly abrupt and irreversible change in permafrost carbon, West Antarctic ice sheets and shelves, and ocean acidification and deoxygenation. These changes could unleash feedback loops that place climate impacts beyond our control (111).

Oceans

The world's oceans face irreversible impacts from climate change, with heating, acidification, stratification, and loss of dissolved oxygen posing high costs for marine ecosystems (112). Ocean heating has intensified (113), with the Southern Ocean taking up most of the excess heat generated by anthropogenic activities (114). These changes affect marine species distributions, interactions, abundance, and biomass. Combined with other stressors like pollution, they are putting marine biodiversity and its societal benefits at risk (115).

Amplified by global heating (116), marine biodiversity is being decimated by more than 440,000 industrial fishing vessels around the world that are responsible for 72% of the world's ocean catch. Over 35% of the world’s marine fishery stock is overfished and another 57% is sustainably fished at the maximum level (117). One study showed that more than 90% of the world's marine food supplies are at risk from environmental changes such as rising temperatures and pollution, essential to over 3.2 billion people. Top producers like China, Norway and the United States face the biggest threat (118). Marine heatwaves (119) are increasing with negative impacts on marine organisms and ecosystems. Marine coastal biodiversity is at risk, with over 98% of coral reefs projected to experience bleaching-level thermal stress by 2050 (120).

Relative to the period 1995–2014, global mean sea level is conservatively projected to rise 0.15–0.29 m by 2050, and 0.28–1.01 m by 2100 (109). Higher rise would ensue from disintegration of Antarctic ice shelves and faster-than-projected ice melt from Greenland (121). On multiple occasions over the past 3 million years, when temperatures increased 1–2°C, global sea levels rose at least 6 m above present levels (122). Sea level rise will flood toxic waste sites, cesspools and septic systems, municipal dumps, and polluted groundwater. In many cases, communities of color will be first to experience health impacts (123).

Ocean pollution affects marine species and people who depend on them. Toxic metals, plastics, manufactured chemicals, petroleum, urban and industrial wastes, pesticides, fertilizers, pharmaceutical chemicals, agricultural runoff, and sewage are the most detrimental and persistent pollutants (124). More than 80% of marine pollutants originate from land-based sources, reaching the oceans through rivers, runoff, and atmospheric deposition. Pollution is heaviest in coastal waters, especially in low- and middle-income countries (125).

Toxic metals such as mercury, lead, and cadmium accumulate in marine animals, causing health problems in fish species and disrupting endocrine systems in their human consumers (126). Plastics take hundreds of years to degrade, breaking down into microplastics that are ingested by fish, humans, and other organisms (127). Manufactured chemicals such as polychlorinated biphenyls and dioxins are environmentally persistent toxins that accumulate in the tissues of marine animals, disrupting hormonal systems (128). Urban and agricultural runoff, and sewage contain pathogens (129), heavy metals, and organic compounds that harm marine animals and cause human health problems. Nitrogen pollution also results in toxic algal blooms and oxygen-depleted dead zones (130). The equity and justice implications of this massive problem have been largely overlooked or downplayed (131).

Terrestrial biome

Tropical forests now emit more carbon than they are able to absorb from the atmosphere as a result of the dual effects of deforestation and land degradation (132). Rich-nation demand (133) for lumber, minerals, beef, and animal feed outside their own borders undermine attempts to mitigate climate change (134). Demand for food, feed, fiber, minerals, and energy is resulting in whole forests being clear-cut. CO2 emissions from boreal forest fires have reached a new high, producing nearly 1/4 of the total global CO2 emissions from wildfires (135). Only 40% of remaining forests have high ecosystem integrity (136). Forests are degraded (137) by drought, pests, and wildfire related (138) to climate change.

Forest loss sacrifices soil biodiversity and integrity to oxidation, dehydration, and heating, transforming soil into a persistent source of CO2 emission (139). Only 2.9% of Earth's land remains ecologically intact (140). Essential ecosystems are disappearing, and many species are at risk of extinction (141). Anthropogenic extinction rates are driving Earth's sixth mass extinction (142). Each year, the world consumes more than 92 Gt of materials—biomass (mostly food), metals, fossil fuels, and minerals. This figure is growing at the rate of 3.2% per year. Resources are being extracted from the planet 3 times faster than in 1970, even though the population has only doubled within that time (143). During the 20th century, this boosted the global economy, but since then resources have become more expensive to extract and the environmental costs harder to ignore.

Both plant and soil carbon storage originate with photosynthesis, which withdraws about 31% of annual anthropogenic CO2 emissions (2). However, studies (144) across a range of forest ecosystems have found that heating leads to thermal stress and reduced carbon assimilation. Many ecosystems (80) are already operating at or beyond thermal thresholds for photosynthesis (145). Widespread terrestrial ecological decline has resulted from the combination of climate change, resource extraction, bushmeat hunting, and agricultural and urban development. Since 1970, vertebrate populations have declined 69% (146), and 1 in 4 species are at risk of extinction (147), in part because 75% of the terrestrial environment has been severely altered by human actions.

Agricultural development has further eroded ecosystem health, with over 15 billion trees per year lost since the emergence of agriculture; the global number of trees has fallen by over 45% (148). An estimated 67,340 km2 of global forest were lost in 2021 alone, unleashing 3.8 Gt of GHG emissions, roughly 10% of the global average (149). Such losses extend to wetland areas; more than 85% of the wetlands present in 1700 had been lost by 2000, and loss of wetlands is currently 3 times faster than forest loss.

Food and water security

Increasing human population, and the need to expand food production, were the drivers of the Green Revolution over 50 years ago (150). This increased productivity through selective genetic breeding, monocultures, seed improvement, and the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides. These steps have not solved the problem of food insecurity which has been aggravated in more vulnerable populations (151). Worldwide, it is estimated that 16,000 children are pushed into hunger every day—a 32% increase from 2022 (152).

Agriculture now uses half of the world's ice- and desert-free land, and causes 78% of global ocean and freshwater eutrophication (153). Pesticide and fertilizer runoff, as well as sewage, find their way to aquatic environments (154) and degrade water quality, while spreading infectious diseases. Humans poison the soil annually with microplastics between 4 and 23 times more than we do the oceans. Microplastics reduce beneficial bacteria concentrations, and can be absorbed by plants, and then passed up the food chain (155).

Industrial farming employs deep plowing that depletes and oxidizes soil, turning acreage into a source of GHG (156). Agriculture is responsible for 70% of global freshwater withdrawals (157). By one estimate (158), 94% of nonhuman mammal biomass is now livestock, and 71% of bird biomass is poultry livestock. 50% of all agricultural expansion has come at the expense of forests. In 2022, the rate of global deforestation was the equivalent of 11 soccer/football fields per minute (40), predominantly for cattle ranching and grain animal feed crops (such as soy) for export.

Today, agriculture uses half of all habitable land (159), and either through grazing or growing animal feed, 77% of that is dedicated to livestock (153). Animal agriculture is expanding. From 1998 to 2018 global meat consumption increased 58%. Cattle and the grain they eat use 1/3 of all available land surface, 1/3 of global grain production, and 16% of all available freshwater. Yet cattle agriculture only generates 18% of food calories and 27% of protein (153). The production of fertilizer for feed crops emits 41 MtCO2/yr. The combination of emissions from manufacturing, transporting, and applying synthetic fertilizer on the land (which releases the potent GHG N2O) today likely outpaces the emissions of the commercial aviation industry. These fertilizer-related GHG emissions are projected to grow. Additionally, livestock feed demands a minimum of 80% of global soybean crop and over 50% of global corn crop. Thirty-five to 40% of yearly anthropogenic CH4 emissions are a result of domestic livestock production due to enteric fermentation and manure (160).

Under a range of GHG emission pathways, cropland exposure to drought and heat-wave events will increase by a factor of 10 in the midterm and a factor of 20–30 in the long term on all continents, especially Asia and Africa (161). Harvest failures across major crop-producing regions are a threat to global food security. Jet stream changes are projected to increase synchronous crop failure and lower crop yields in multiple agricultural regions around the world (162). Crop failure due to drought, flood, or extreme weather (163) events increases disproportionately between 1.5 and 2°C of global heating (164). For maize, risks of multiple breadbasket failures increase from 6– 40% at 1.5°C to 54% at 2°C. In relative terms, the highest climate risk increases, between 1.5 and 2°C heating, is for wheat (40%), followed by maize (35%) and soybean (23%). Limiting global heating to 1.5°C would reduce the risk of simultaneous crop failure for maize, wheat, and soybean by 26%, 28%, and 19%, respectively (164).

Demand for wheat is projected to increase 60% by 2050. Yet, rising CO2 depletes the nutrient and protein content of wheat, and with drought, fire, and flood, leads to a 15% decline in projected wheat yield by midcentury (165). Increased levels of CO2 are decreasing the amount of protein, iron, zinc, and B vitamins in rice with potential adverse health consequences for a global population of approximately 600 million (166). Harvests of staple cereal crops, such as rice and maize, could decrease by 20–40% as a function of heightened surface temperatures in tropical and subtropical regions by 2100 (167). This will exacerbate existing food security issues, as 1 billion people are currently classified as food insecure (168).

Worldwide, fungal infections cause growers to lose 10–23% of their crops each year, and an additional 10–20% is lost following harvest. Global heating is driving a poleward migration of fungal infections, meaning more countries will see fungal infections damaging harvests. Growers have reported wheat stem rust infections, usually tropical, in Ireland and England. Experts (169) also warn that fungi tolerance to higher temperatures could increase the likelihood of soil-dwelling pathogens to infect animals or humans. Across the five most important calorie crops of rice, wheat, maize (corn), soybeans, and potatoes, fungal infections already cause losses equal to provisions for 600 million to 4 billion people. Without major and rapid policy changes, food productivity in 2050 could be reduced to 1980 yield levels because new technologies will be unable to mitigate climate change in major growing regions (170).

Clean water security is a critical issue (171). Research shows that groundwater levels are rapidly declining, especially in dry regions with extensive croplands, and has accelerated over the past four decades in 30% of the world's regional aquifers (172). The Southern Hemisphere has experienced a 20% drop in water availability over the past two decades (173). Approximately 3.6 billion people, or 47% of the global population, suffer water scarcity at least 1 month each year (174). Global water security is an urgent concern due to the increasing imbalance between the finite supply of freshwater and the escalating demand driven by population growth, economic development, and agricultural needs. Climate change compounds the crisis by altering precipitation patterns, causing droughts, and depleting glaciers—key freshwater sources. Contamination from industrial, agricultural, and residential waste further restricts the amount of clean water available. This scarcity threatens human health, food production, and ecosystem stability, leading to conflicts and displacements. Addressing this problem requires global cooperation for sustainable management, technological innovation for conservation and purification, and policies that prioritize equitable access to clean water (174).

Heat

The impact of heat on food production is disproportionately severe in low-income communities. Workers in agriculture, construction, and other outdoor sectors often work in conditions that can lead to heat stress or heatstroke. Food production, too, is critically affected as extreme heat can reduce crop yields, increase irrigation needs, and lead to soil degradation. These communities have less access to heat-protection technologies such as air-conditioned spaces, efficient irrigation systems, or heat-resistant crop varieties. Consequently, their economic stability and food security are more vulnerable to climate-induced temperature increases, exacerbating existing inequalities and pushing these populations further into poverty.

In 2022, global heat stress caused the loss of 490 billion potential labor hours, 143 h per person, a 42% increase from the 1991 to 2000 average (175). The loss of labor due to heat exposure resulted in a $863 billion loss of “potential income” and wiped out the equivalent of 4% of Africa's GDP. The agriculture sector was hardest hit, accounting for 82% of losses in least developed countries. The global land area affected by at least 1 month of extreme drought per year increased from 18% averaged over the decade 1951–1960 to 47% in the decade 2013–2022. Because of heat stress, under a 2°C warming scenario, 525 million additional people will experience food insecurity by midcentury, compared to the period 1995–2014, and the number of heat-related deaths each year will increase by 370%. Older people and infants now are exposed to twice the number of heat-wave days annually as they were averaged over the period 1986–2005.

Heat-related deaths of people older than 65 have increased by 85% since the 1990s (175). Even under moderate warming, heat and drought levels in Europe that were virtually impossible 20 years ago reach 1-in-10 likelihoods as early as the 2030s (84). Averaged over the period 2050–2074, projections for two successive years of single or compound end-of-century extremes, unprecedented to date, exceed 1-in-10 likelihoods; while Europe-wide 5-year megadroughts become plausible. Whole decades of end-of-century heat stress could start by 2040, by 2020 for drought, and with a warm North Atlantic, end-of-century decades starting as early as 2030 become twice as likely.

For thousands of years, fundamental limits on food and water security meant that human communities have concentrated under a narrow range of climate variables characterized by mean annual temperatures (MATs) around 13°C (18). With continued GHG emissions, global heating of 3°C is projected to drive a MAT >29°C across 19% of the planet's land surface and displace one-third of the human population. Today, this MAT accounts for only 0.8% percent of Earth's land surface, mostly concentrated in the deep Sahara.

Model projections indicate that in the Middle East and North Africa, continued emissions will cause the emergence of unprecedented super- and ultraextreme heat-wave conditions (176). These events involve excessively warm temperatures (56°C and higher) and will be of extended duration (several weeks), quickly becoming life-threatening for humans (177). Researchers found that by 2100, under current levels of GHG emissions, 3 of 4 people in the world will be exposed to deadly heat conditions every year, with a higher occurrence of these conditions in intertropical areas (2). Coupled with significant socioeconomic differences within countries, heat waves intensify global disparities in health, especially given the depleted resources for several of these regions to respond to accelerated heating. In the last decade, there has been >2,300% increase in the loss of human life from heat waves as a result of about 1°C heating. On our current pathway, the global health and socioeconomic risks of continued heating are catastrophic.

The distribution of these conditions is unequal, and people and communities subjected to the loss of security are powerless to respond. The impacts of this inequity may cause regionally existential deterioration and suffering. As temperatures rise, death rates increase most among the poorest populations (178). By 2099, under a scenario of continued high emissions growth, climate change increases death rates in low-income countries by over 106 deaths per 100,000, while high-income countries are projected to see death rates decrease by 25 deaths per 100,000, while spending significantly to prevent more deaths. Overall, today's rich countries pay nearly 3 times more than poor countries to adapt to rising temperatures and prevent additional deaths. When it comes to cutting emissions, the social and economic burden of inaction is predominantly carried by the poorest and most vulnerable in human society, including Indigenous and local communities, concentrated in developing countries.

Illness and disease

As the planet heats up, infectious diseases once confined to tropical regions are expanding their range. The World Health Organization estimates that by the end of this decade the climate impact on health will cost between $2 billion and $4 billion per year (179). Between 2030 and 2050, climate change is expected to cause approximately 250,000 additional deaths per year from, for example, undernutrition, malaria, cholera, diarrhea, and heat stress alone. This does not include massive climate burdens on agriculture, water, and sanitation, which also shape public health.

In July 2023, for the first time in 20 years, the United States experienced locally acquired malaria infections. Six cases were confirmed in Florida and one in Texas, none related to international travel (180). In Seattle, cases of West Nile disease were reported for the first time. Over half of the infectious diseases confronted by humanity have been aggravated by climatic hazards at some point (181). All communities are vulnerable to climate change impacts; however, children, elders, the sick, and the poor face the greatest risks (182). People with cardiovascular and/or respiratory chronic illnesses are particularly vulnerable to high temperatures (183). Air pollution from GHG emissions leads to increased health complications such as asthma and allergies. The impacts of climate change disproportionately affect vulnerable communities, including low-income regions and communities of color which have been disempowered by a history of colonialism, racism, oppression, and injustice. Extreme weather events further exacerbate the situation, driving animals and people together in unsanitary conditions and disrupting essential services like healthcare and clean water supplies.

Approximately 17% of diseases are spread by animal vectors causing over 700,000 deaths annually. Concentrated animal farming operations are breeding grounds for virulent pathogens (184), and over 15,000 new cases of mammals transmitting viruses to other mammals could occur in the next 50 years due to climate change (185). Smaller species like bats, rats, and other rodents are thriving in human-populated areas, contributing to the spread of diseases through their interactions. Biodiversity loss and deforestation are directly linked to the rise of infectious diseases, with 1/3 of zoonotic diseases attributed to these factors. Some 60% of known pathogens, and 3 out of every 4 new or emergent infectious diseases are zoonotic (186), and roughly 1/3 of those are attributed to deforestation and habitat loss (187). A new disease surfaces 5 times a year, and future global heating and precipitation changes will further expand habitats for pathogens and vectors, proliferating dengue fever, cholera, malaria, diarrhea, and other diseases (188).

Climate change intensifies the spread of infectious diseases, particularly in low-income communities, by expanding the habitats of disease vectors such as mosquitoes and ticks. Warmer temperatures and altered rainfall patterns increase the incidence and geographic range of vector-borne diseases like malaria and dengue fever. Flooding and extreme weather events, more common as the climate changes, can lead to waterborne diseases due to the contamination of freshwater supplies. Low-income areas often have insufficient healthcare infrastructure, making them more vulnerable to these outbreaks. Additionally, malnutrition from climate-induced food scarcity can weaken immune systems, further raising the susceptibility to infections. Thus, climate change magnifies health disparities, with low-income communities facing disproportionately high risks of disease.

Economic inequality, ecological destruction, and global security

A grossly unequal distribution of wealth couples with the increasing consumption patterns of a rising global middle class (189) to amplify ecological destruction. The poorest half of the global population owns barely 2% of total global wealth, while the richest 10% owns 76% of all wealth (190). The poorest 50% of the global population contribute just 10% of emissions, while the richest 10% emit more than 50% total carbon emissions (191). Climate change, economic inequality, and rising consumption levels intertwine to amplify ecological destruction.

Climate change, driven by carbon emissions, often stems from industrial activities catering to increased consumption, particularly in wealthier nations. This consumption depletes natural resources and exacerbates pollution and habitat loss. Economic inequality compounds these issues, as poorer communities lack the resources to adapt to environmental changes or invest in sustainable practices. Consequently, low-income communities bear the brunt of ecological degradation, such as soil erosion, water scarcity, and biodiversity loss, while their limited economic means prevent effective response or recovery. This cycle of consumption, inequality, and environmental impact creates a feedback loop, perpetuating and intensifying ecological damage globally.

Fifty years ago, underdevelopment and scarcity were drivers of unsustainable resource use, but today these roots have morphed into overdevelopment, affluence, and privilege driving unsustainable wealth accumulation and aggregate consumption. At present, not a single country delivers what its citizens need without transgressing planetary boundaries of long-term sustainability (192). Modern imperialism amplifies these inequalities through economic exploitation, wealth accumulation, political interference, cultural dominance, and other methods that leverage colonial power structures. Recognizing and addressing neocolonial practices is crucial for promoting equitable and sustainable development and respecting the sovereignty and self-determination of nations (193).

The use of natural materials and their benefits are unevenly distributed across the globe. Overconsumption is closely linked to wealth and income disparities with large amounts of money concentrated in a few rich countries, largely in the Northern Hemisphere (194). For example, environmental stresses and shocks related to natural resource extraction and use are outsourced to countries and regions outside the European Union, while more than 85% of the economic benefits stay within member countries (195).

Global inequality results in fragile regions where intensified conflict over scarce resources allows malevolent actors to thrive (196). One study (197) found strong causal evidence linking climatic events to human conflict across all major regions of the world: for each 1 SD (1σ) change in climate toward warmer temperatures or more extreme rainfall, data show that the frequency of interpersonal violence rises 4% and the frequency of intergroup conflict rises 14%. Temperatures across the developed world are expected to warm 2σ to 4σ by 2050. Hence, amplified rates of human conflict could represent a large and critical impact of anthropogenic climate change.

Over the next 3 decades, even under best-case scenarios of low heating, national, and global security face severe risks in every region of the world. Higher levels of heating will pose catastrophic, and likely irreversible, global security risks over the course of the 21st century. A world where global mean surface temperature has increased 3°C will be characterized by widespread and intense heat stress, extreme weather events, ruptured and unproductive marine and terrestrial ecosystems, broken food systems, disease and morbidity, intense decadal megadrought, freshwater scarcity, catastrophic sea level rise, and large numbers of migrant populations. By 2050, under these malignant conditions, up to 1.2 billion humans could be displaced by climate change (198). These intensifying crises now threaten the very fabric of our global socioeconomic system. Immediate action is imperative to avert a collapse that endangers societal structures worldwide.

Climate purgatory

Although the global condition is bleak, after 200 years of fossil fuel expansion, we are at a turning point in the energy system. The clean-energy revolution is underway. Global sales of vehicles powered by fossil fuels peaked in 2017 (199), and in 2023 electric vehicle sales grew by 55%, reaching a record high of more than 10 million. For the first time ever, announced manufacturing capacity for electric vehicle batteries is now sufficient to fulfill expected demand requirements by 2030 (200).

Renewable energy installations jumped nearly 50% in 2023, the most rapid growth rate in two decades (200). After remaining flat for several years, global clean energy spending is increasing. Last year, renewables made up about 30% of total electricity generation, up from 25% in 2018. Global investment in the energy transition totaled $1.77 trillion in 2023, an increase of 17% from the prior year. Solar energy is expected to become the cheapest form of energy in many places by 2030 and major global powers are investing in infrastructure for energy transformation.

However, increasing global energy consumption offsets these gains in renewable energy. Because of rising power needs in developing nations due to population growth and industrialization, ongoing electrification of the transport and building sectors, and other areas of energy expansion, the International Energy Agency (IEA) projects increasing growth of energy demand, rising at an annual average rate of 3.4% in 2024–2026. Although the expansion of clean-energy sources is set to meet this demand growth, decoupling energy consumption and CO2 production, the separation is not nearly wide enough to meet Paris Agreement Goals for stopping global heating.

#### Only decreasing economic complexity prevents next generation threats. Downscaling redistributes gains and achieves sustainable self-reliance.

Balland ’22 [Pierre-Alexandre, Tom Broekel, Dario Diodato, Elisa Giuliani, Ricardo Hausmann, Neave O’Clery, and David Rigby; 2022; Department of Economic Geography, Utrecht University, Center for Collective Learning, Artificial and Natural Intelligence Toulouse Institute; Research Policy, “The new paradigm of economic complexity,” vol. 51]

Since the first industrial revolution, exponential gains in economic complexity have accrued in tandem with unprecedented levels of innovation and wealth generation. While a trillion isolated individuals could never build an airplane, let alone put a human on the moon, a far smaller number of interacting agents who specialize and trade can, given the right incentives, produce a dizzying array of massively complex products. Complex products, and the complex sets of capabilities on which they rest, emerge from deep divisions of labor driven by competition within the market economy. This is why the first direct policy implication of the field of economic complexity has been for countries and regions to specialize into more complex economic activities (Hausmann et al., 2011; Balland et al., 2019; Hidalgo, 2021). Supporting economic upgrading by building complex capabilities is a superior development strategy to chasing the ability to produce high-priced goods. Commodity prices can shift rapidly with changing market conditions, regulations, and customer preferences. Developing the capabilities to create and produce complex products is a viable path to secure long-run growth as these capabilities tend to evolve in self-reinforcing processes of recombination, rewarding most of those actors, firms, and places that are already embedded in networks of complex activity.

One unfortunate consequence of the growth and concentration of economic complexity is rising levels of inequality. By their nature, more complex systems also tend to be more unequal. Preferential attachment, compounding, self-reinforcing feedback loops, and multiplicative processes that are inherent to complex adaptive systems increase inequality. As a result, some individuals, organizations, and places will occupy privileged positions in which they can leverage larger parts of an economy’s structure and accumulate most of the benefits. Others will be much less fortunate, either because they have the wrong skills, they are located in the wrong place, or they face other factors that prevent them from engaging in economic activities. In our modern world, inequality is striking. Walmart’s Walton family leverages labor structures, Warren Buffet leverages capital, and digital platforms leverage code and media to secure and expand dominant economic positions. This is consistent with earlier innovation research which points at the uneven distributional effects of technological revolutions or advancements (e.g., Perez, 2013) and suggests a need to find new ways to govern capitalism in order to avoid the concentration of economic and political power to the detriment of society (Giuliani, 2018). These ideas echo recent empirical research showing how technological giants handling and generating highly complex knowledge in domains such as ICT and artificial intelligence have built knowledge monopolies from innovations and exclusive access to data (Rikap and Lundvall, 2020), while others have raised concerns about the geographic distributional imbalances caused by high tech companies’ concentration of monopoly rents (Feldman et al., 2021). These monopolies create fat-tailed distributions and challenge existing (cohesion-oriented) social structures. The imbalances and inequalities generated by growing complexity require new policy responses to generate equitable returns and secure futures for all.

As complexity shapes multiple dimensions of economic development, the inequality that it generates is also manifest in different forms. One of the most pervasive of those forms is uneven spatial development. Larger, urban centers in advanced industrialized economies are the primary beneficiaries of the growth of complexity (Mewes and Broekel, 2021; Pintar and Scherngell, 2021; Van Dam and Frenken, 2021). Given the self-reinforcing nature of complexity, uneven development is difficult to manage or slow down. Yet, policy must confront the spatial consequences of complexity, rapid urbanization and the siphoning of resources from peripheral regions that are often viewed as “places that don’t matter”, fueling populism and social unrest (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). Given the path-dependent nature of these processes, it is more than likely that complexity dynamics will tend to reinforce the current status rather than breaking-up existing structures. In any case, the fundamental dynamics of economic complexity require a policy response.

How do we raise prospects for those working in less complex economies? A general goal is to help these economies leverage the capabilities that they already possess to diversify into more complex forms of economic activity. Thus, smart investment for economic development involves identifying the foundations of existing strengths and mapping potential pathways towards a more complex set of capabilities. Identification of these pathways requires knowledge of the “distances” between economic activities. Measures of economic relatedness that span occupations, products, industries, and technologies provide these “distance” metrics (see Pinheiro et al., 2021 in this Special Issue). This second complexity policy directive stems from the fact that new sets of capabilities are created by recombining pre-existing capabilities (Mowery et al., 1998). The toolbox of economic complexity is, in fact, also becoming more prominent in policy programs of the European Commission, including innovation and industrial strategies (Pugliese and Tacchella, 2020) and smart specialization (Balland et al., 2019). Yet, while relatedness and complexity seem to be considered in most support strategies, it is rare to find them strategically combined, as regional priorities seem to be based on complexity or relatedness concerns in isolation (Deegan et al., 2021). Further research is required to develop place-based policy interventions that utilize relatedness to support the emergence of more complex activities.

Continued growth in levels of economic complexity implies further specialization that is likely to demand increased interdependencies in the economic system. This has important consequences for questions of resilience to exogenous shocks at multiple spatial scales. While more interdependent systems can be more vulnerable to sudden disruptions, complex systems in contrast usually exhibit remarkable robustness to this. In this case, the increasing interdependence in the system needs to go hand-in-hand with decentralization of decision making and capabilities, as well as dynamic capabilities of reconfiguration. The latter may be as much about structure as about agency. Here, research has just started. The same applies to sustainability since enhanced complexity in some regions of the world may have a neither neutral nor positive impact on other non-complex regions. Increasing interactions of specialized actors are likely to imply more movements of people, goods, and energy, all of which involve substantial environmental and social costs. For instance, increasing mobility of talent not only drains environmental resources, but also challenges established social networks and cultural embeddedness, and as a consequence individual as well as social well-being. The growing complexity of the economy has yielded levels of prosperity and innovation that would not have been imaginable only a few decades ago. It has provided policy opportunities for economic development but also an entirely new set of challenges. Managing human hyperconnectivity and its consequences – ranging from climate change, inequality, spatial polarization, and disease transmission – might be one of the most pressing policy challenges of the 21st century.

### Disasters---1NC

#### No impact to disasters.

Sandberg ’18 [Anders; February 18; Senior Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford; Natural Hazard Science, “Human Extinction from Natural Hazard Events,” https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199389407.013.293]

It is possible to place upper bounds on extinction risks due to natural disasters by considering the fossil record. This can be done in several ways; the following will be based on the work of Toby Ord (2017). The simplest bound is based on the observation that H. sapiens has existed for 200,000 years: this observation would be unlikely if the extinction risk was higher than about 1 in 3,000 per century. One can say that an extinction rate of 0.15% or higher per century is ruled out at a 95% confidence level.

Another bound uses now-extinct related hominin species as a reference class, producing estimates in the range 0.001% to 0.05% per century. This is in line with survival times for mammalian species, which typically is 1–2 million years (Raup, 1978) but shorter than for the entire fossil record where lifetimes of 5–10 million years are typical (Raup, 1986; May, Lawton, & Stork, 1995).

H. sapiens is an unusually populous, well-dispersed, and adaptable large mammal species. However, it also has high food requirements and a long generation time. It may then be that the most likely risk to lead to extinction would be a mass-extinction level risk. Large mass extinctions occur at a rate of about 1 in 100 million years, producing a risk estimate of 0.0001% per century.

### Civil War---1NC

#### No civil war.

Reich ’23 [Robert, June 12; Professor of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley, former United States Secretary of Labor; The Guardian, “There will be no civil war over Trump. Here’s why,” https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/jun/12/trump-civil-war-chances-documents-indictment]

Violence is possible, but there will be no civil war.

Nations don’t go to war over whether they like or hate specific leaders. They go to war over the ideologies, religions, racism, social classes or economic policies these leaders represent.

But Trump represents nothing other than his own grievance with a system that refused him a second term and is now beginning to hold him accountable for violating the law.

In addition, the guardrails that protected American democracy after the 2020 election – the courts, state election officials, the military, and the justice department – are stronger than before Trump tested them the first time.

Many of those who stormed the Capitol have been tried and convicted. Election-denying candidates were largely defeated in the 2022 midterms. The courts have adamantly backed federal prosecutors.

Third, Trump’s advocates are having difficulty defending the charges in the unsealed indictment – that Trump threatened America’s security by illegally holding (and in some cases sharing) documents concerning “United States nuclear programs; potential vulnerabilities of the United States and its allies to military attack; and plans for possible retaliation in response to a foreign attack”, and then shared a “plan of attack” against Iran.

Republicans consider national security the highest and most sacred goal of the republic. A large number have served in the armed forces.

#### No terrorism impact. Bathtubs have a higher kill count.

Mueller ’21 [John and Mark G. Stewart; 2021; PhD, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Ohio State University and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute; PhD, Professor of Civil Engineering and Director of the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia; international leader in risk assessment, public policy decision-making, and protective infrastructure for extreme hazards; Terrorism and Political Violence, “Terrorism and Bathtubs: Comparing and Assessing the Risks,” vol. 33, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2018.1530662]

The likelihood that anyone outside a war zone will be killed by an Islamist extremist terrorist is extremely small. In the United States, for example, some six people have perished each year since 9/11 at the hands of such terrorists—for an annual fatality rate of about one in 50 million for the period.

This might be taken to suggest, as one writer has characterized it, that “terrorism is such a minor threat to American life and limb that it’s simply bizarre—just stupefyingly irrational and intellectually unserious—to suppose that it could even begin to justify the abolition of privacy rights as they have been traditionally understood in favour of the installation of a panoptic surveillance state.”1 And terrorism specialist Marc Sageman characterizes the threat terrorists present in the United States as “rather negligible.”2 The vast majority of what is commonly tallied as terrorism has occurred in war zones, and this is especially true for fatalities.3 But even this has been exaggerated by conflating terrorism with war: civil war violence that would previously have been seen to be acts of insurgency are now often labeled terrorism.4

In order to put the numbers in some context, it has often been pointed out that far more Americans are killed each year not only by such highly destructive hazards as drug overdoses or automobile accidents, but even by such comparatively minor ones as lightning, accident-causing deer, peanut allergies, or drowning in bathtubs. Some comparisons are arrayed in Table l.

In recent years, however, critics have attacked what they call "the bathtub fallacy."

First, they stress that it is important to keep in mind that bathtubs are not out to kill you while terrorism is a willful act carried out by diabolical, dedicated, and clever human beings. Thus, although the number of people Islamist terrorists have been able to kill in the West since 9/11 has thus far been quite limited, those terrorists, as they plot and plan and learn from experience, may very well become far more destructive in the future.

Second, the critics charge that the comparison of terrorism with bathtub drownings is incomplete in that it doesn't consider the possibility that the incidence of terrorist destruction is ow precisely because counterterrorism measures are so effective.

Third, it is argued that, unlike bathtub drownings, terrorism exacts costs far beyond those entailed in the event itself. It damagingly sows terror, fear, and anxiety; disturbs our psychological well-being; undermines trust and openness within the society; and reduces our sense of intrinsic moral worth even as it increases a sense of helplessness.

They maintain, fourth, that the comparison is invalid because, unlike terrorism, bath tubs provide benefit.

And finally, they contend that terrorism costs are peculiarly high, particularly in a democratic society, because the fears it generates will necessarily need to be serviced by policy makers, and this pressure forces, or inspires, them to adopt countermeasures, both foreign and domestic, that are costly and sometimes even excessive.

In this article, we examine these five propositions and find all of them to be wanting. In the process, we conclude that terrorism is rare outside war zones because, to a substantial degree, terrorists don’t exist there. In general, as with rare diseases that kill few, it makes more policy sense to expend limited funds on hazards that inflict far more damage.

Terrorism is willed and may well become more destructive

Journalist Jeffrey Goldberg has suggested that “the fear of terrorism isn’t motivated solely by what terrorists have done, but what terrorists hope to do.” Bathtubs are simply not “engaged in a conspiracy with other bathtubs to murder ever-larger numbers of Americans.” However, terrorists “in the Islamist orbit,” he insists, “seek unconventional weapons that would allow them to kill a far-larger number of Americans than died on Sept. 11.”6 Or as Janan Ganesh of the Financial Times puts it, “Bathroom deaths could multiply by 50 without a threat to civil order. The incidence of terror could not.”7

Thus far, 9/11 stands out as an extreme outlier: scarcely any terrorist act, before or after, in war zones or outside them, has inflicted even one-tenth as much total destruction. That is, contrary to common expectations, the attack has thus far been an aberration, not a harbinger.8 And al-Qaeda central, the group responsible for the attack, has, in some respects at least, proved to resemble President John Kennedy’s assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald—an entity of almost trivial proportions that got horribly lucky once. The tiny group of perhaps 100 or so does appear to have served as something of an inspiration to some Muslim extremists. They may have done some training, may have contributed a bit to the Taliban’s far larger insurgency in Afghanistan, and may have participated in a few terrorist acts in Pakistan. In his examination of the major terrorist plots against the West since 9/11, Mitchell Silber finds only two—the shoe bomber attempt of 2001 and the effort to blow up transatlantic airliners with liquid bombs in 2006—that could be said to be under the “command and control” of al-Qaeda central (as opposed to ones suggested, endorsed, or inspired by the organization), and there are questions about how full its control was even in these two instances, both of which, as it happens, failed miserably.9 And, although some al-Qaeda affiliates have committed substantial damage in the Middle East, usually in the context of civil wars, their efforts to carry out terrorism in the West have been rare and completely ineffective.10 Even under siege, it is difficult to see why al-Qaeda could not have carried out attacks at least as costly and shocking as the shooting rampages (organized by other groups) that took place in Mumbai in 2008 or at a shopping center in Kenya in 2013. Neither took huge resources, presented major logistical challenges, required the organization of a large number of perpetrators, or needed extensive planning.

However, there is of course no guarantee that things will remain that way, and the 9/11 attacks inspired the remarkable extrapolation that, because the terrorists were successful with box cutters, they might soon be able to turn out weapons of mass destruction— particularly nuclear ones—and then detonate them in an American city. For example, in his influential 2004 book, Nuclear Terrorism, Harvard’s Graham Allison relayed his “considered judgment” that “on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not.”11 Allison has had a great deal of company in his alarming pronouncements. In 2007, the distinguished physicist Richard Garwin put the likelihood of a nuclear explosion on an American or European city by terrorist or other means at 20 percent per year, which would work out to 91 percent over the eleven year period to 2018.12

Allison’s time is up, and so is Garwin’s. These oft-repeated warnings have proven to be empty. And it is important to point out that not only have terrorists failed to go nuclear, but as William Langewiesche, who has assessed the process in detail, put it in 2007, “The best information is that no one has gotten anywhere near this. I mean, if you look carefully and practically at this process, you see that it is an enormous undertaking full of risks for the would-be terrorists.”13 That process requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumber some, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders.

Nor have terrorist groups been able to steal existing nuclear weapons—characteristically burdened with multiple safety devices and often stored in pieces at separate secure locales—from existing arsenals as was once much feared. And they certainly have not been able to cajole leaders in nuclear states to palm one off to them—though a war inflicting more death than Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined was launched against Iraq in 2003 in major part under the spell of fantasies about such a handover.14

More generally, the actual terrorist “adversaries” in the West scarcely deserve accolades for either dedication or prowess. It is true, of course, that sometimes even incompetents can get lucky, but such instances, however tragic, are rare. For the most part, terrorists in the United States are a confused, inadequate, incompetent, blundering, and gullible bunch, only occasionally able to get their act together. Most seem to be far better at frenetic and often self-deluded scheming than at actual execution. A summary assessment by RAND’s Brian Jenkins is apt: “their numbers remain small, their determination limp, and their competence poor.”15 And much the same holds for Europe and the rest of the developed world.16 Also working against terrorist success in the West is the fact that almost all are amateurs: they have never before tried to do something like this. Unlike criminals they have not been able to develop street smarts.

Except perhaps for the use of vehicles to deliver mayhem (though this idea is by no means new in the history of terrorism), there has been remarkably little innovation in terrorist weaponry or methodology since 9/11.17 Like their predecessors, they have continued to rely on bombs (many of which fail to detonate or do much damage) and bullets.1